1 010601
2 IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF FEDERAL CLAIMS
3 -------------------------------x
4 NORTHROP GRUMMAN :
5 CORPORATION, :
6 Plaintiff, : No. 97-359C
7 v. : (JudgeHodges)
8 THE UNITED STATES, :
9 Defendant. :
10 -------------------------------x
11 Washington, D.C.
12 Wednesday, January 6, 1999
13 DEPOSITION OF:
14 DANIEL S. GOLDIN,
15 a witness, called for examination by counsel for the
16 Plaintiff, pursuant to notice and agreement of
17 counsel, in the offices of NASA Headquarters, 300 E
18 Street, Southwest, Washington, D.C. 20546, beginning
19 at approximately 1:05 p.m., before WILLIAM J. ALLEN,
20 a Notary Public in and for the District of Columbia,
21 when were present on behalf of the respective
22 parties:
0002
1 APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL:
2 For the Plaintiff:
3 Feith & Zell, P.C.
4 BY: J. WILLIAM ESHELMAN, ESQUIRE
5 J. MICHAEL LITTLEJOHN, ESQUIRE
6 2300 M Street, Northwest
7 Suite 600
8 Washington, D.C. 20037
9 (202) 293-1600
10 For the Defendant:
11 Department of Justice
12 BY: SHALOM BRILLIANT, ESQUIRE
13 EILEEN BELL, ESQUIRE
14 Commercial Litigation Branch
15 Civil Division
16 1100 L Street, Northwest
17 Seventh Floor
18 Washington, D.C. 20530
0003
1
2 APPEARANCES (continued
3
4 National Aeronautics and Space Administration:
5 BY: DAVID GAYLE, ESQUIRE
6 EDWARD A. _FRANKLEŚ_, ESQUIRE
7 300 E Street, Southwest
8 Washington, D.C. 20546
9 (202) 358-2074
10 Also Present:
11 Michael A. Tomasulo
12 Martin C. Blyseth
0004
1 I N D E X
2 THE WITNESS: EXAMINATION BY:
3 Daniel S. Goldin Mr. Eshelman,
4
5 E X H I B I T S
6 DEPOSITION EXHIBIT NUMBER: IDENTIFIED ON PAGE:
7 248 36
8 249 47
9 250 63
10 54 83
11 132 83
12 98 96
13 126 105
14 99 110
15 251 118
16 252 120
17 105 132
18 116 146
19 195 157
20 163 168
21 EXHIBITS ANNEXED TO COURT COPY OF THIS DEPOSITION
22 TRANSCRIPT.
0005
1 P R O C E E D I N G S
2 Whereupon,
3 DANIEL
S. GOLDIN,
4 a witness, called for examination, having been first
5 duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
6 EXAMINATION BY COUNSEL
7 FOR THE PLAINTIFF
8 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
9 Q. State your name, please.
10 A. Daniel S. Goldin.
11 Q. Mr. Goldin, you recall we met earlier this
12 year, so I will skip the preliminaries and go right
13 to the questions.
14 I would like to direct your attention to
15 the period of 1992, say the last quarter, first half
16 of 1993.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. In particular the period covered by the
19 SRT, the Station Redesign Team.
20 Do you recall when that was?
21 A. Roughly.
22 Q. May to June of '93?
0006
1 A. Yes. I don't know the exact dates but it
2 was in the spring of '93.
3 Q. Between June of '92 and say June 30, 1993,
4 1 June 1992 to June 30 '93, did you ever discuss
5 redesign options with any contractors other than at
6 the July 22nd 1993 meeting you had with the CEOs?
7 A. Sure. 8 Q. Which contractors?
9 A. It was more than contractors. First of
10 all --
11 Q. Let's limit it to the four Freedom primes,
12 which would be Rockwell, McDonnell, Boeing and
13 Grumman.
14 A. I want to define terms here because you
15 define time periods but didn't include the redesign,
16 per se. Because we didn't even think about redesign
17 until February of '93. In February of '93 as I
18 recollect initially there was a thought that the
19 Space Station would be canceled.
20 Q. And that was communicated to you by the
21 White House?
0007
1 And then there was a period of uncertainty
2 as to whether or not there would be a space station.
3 And then at some time we were asked to do a redesign
4 and then went into an official redesign, I don't know
5 when, maybe March or April of '93, something like
6 that.
7 Q. So from February of '93 there was no prior
8 consideration --
9 A. Yes and no. There was no White House
10 directed consideration. But sometime in the summer
11 of '90, I took a look at the Space Station, I had
12 been an officer a few months, and said this thing
13 looks like it is not going to work. It had gone on
14 for eight years and they spent 8 or 10 billion and
15 nothing happened.
16 Q. This was in '90?
17 A. In '92. And it looked like a complete and
18 absolute disaster.
19 So I took it upon myself to think about
20 redesign approaches and I talked to a lot of people,
21 I don't know who, but a lot of people openly, inside
22 NASA, outside NASA about that possibility. I can't
0008
1 list who that was. And then we came up with an
2 approach which would be completely different than the
3 Space Station Freedom approach. And within about a
4 week of the time that that design came forward, I was
5 called in to the White house and Congress and told to
6 stop working on it because the contractors didn't
7 want it to happen.
8 Q. In February of '93?
9 A. No. In the summer of '92, the Space
10 Station contractors went to the Congress and
11 complained to the Congress that the NASA
12 administrator who was in charge of America Space
13 Program didn't have the right to look at any other
14 design but Space Station Freedom.
15 Q. Who called you in from Congress, or who in
16 Congress?
17 A. I didn't get called in. Let me say I got
18 messages sent to me indirectly.
19 Q. By who?
20 A. By various people.
21 Q. Mr. Mallow?
22 A. He never talked to me directly, but he
0009
1 talked to me through Aaron Cohen.
2 Q. At Johnson Space Center?
3 A. Yes. I got called into the director's
4 office of NASA and my subordinate -- and I was
5 screamed at by my subordinate because Congress was
6 unhappy with me because I had the unmitigated gall to
7 ask for another look at the Space Station design.
8 Q. Let's go to the time frame March to June.
9 That is time frame with the redesign team.
10 A. June of '93.
11 Q. And let's limit the consideration to the
12 four Freedom contractors. That would be McDonnell,
13 Boeing, Rocketdyne and Grumman.
14 Did you discuss with any of them what the
15 SRT was doing?
16 A. In that time frame I don't remember
17 specifically, but I did have meetings with some of
18 the CEOs.
19 Q. Other than the CEO meetings?
20 A. Yes. There were representatives of the
21 different companies that came in and talked to me and
22 I don't remember who. But I did talk to somebody.
0010
1 Q. Did you ever discuss the options that the
2 SRT was discussing with any of these CEOs or with any
3 of these companies, representatives of these
4 companies?
5 A. The options were an open discussion in
6 Washington. And at the time, as I recollect, each of
7 the companies was lobbying their position up on
8 Capitol Hill openly, and openly discussing it because
9 nothing at NASA is closed.
10 And my recollection is that numerous times
11 I would go to meetings and presentations and people
12 would talk to me about the options. Some contractors
13 lobbied to keep the Space Station even though the
14 President of the United States said we were going to
15 change
it. And some companies went up to the Hill to
16 lobby to keep Space Station Freedom. Some parts of
17 companies supported the redesign, and then there were
18 renegade operations in some companies that were
19 working directly with the Congress not to have the
20 redesign occur.
21 Q. Let's go to the associated acquisition
22 strategy with each option. I understand that each
0011
1 option was an open discussion. Did you discuss the
2 acquisition strategy associated with each option with
3 any company or companies?
4 A. There was a different acquisition strategy
5 for each option. Are you giving me information I
6 don't know?
7 Q. Did you discuss the acquisition strategies
8 that the SRT was considering that were associated
9 with the options?
10 A. I don't know, I don't recollect, I might
11 have but I don't recollect specific discussions on
12 that.
13 Q. Do you ever recall discussions with
14 representatives of Grumman to the effect that Grumman
15 would be eliminated under any option that was
16 considered or that was set forth by the SRT?
17 A. I don't recollect such a discussion.
18 Q. With any representative of Grumman?
19 A. I don't recollect such a discussion.
20 Q. Did you ever suggest to any representative
21 of Grumman that Grumman submit a proposal to be a
22 prime contractor or a single point of contact or
0012
1 responsibility for the Space Station program?
2 A. I don't recollect such a discussion.
3 Q. If you don't recollect any discussion, did
4 you ever have such a discussion with any of the other
5 Freedom contractors, Boeing, McDonnell or Rocketdyne
6 or Boeing?
7 A. I don't know.
8 Q. Did you ever discuss with any of the other
9 companies, Rocketdyne, Grumman or McDonnell-Douglas
10 the idea of Boeing being single prime?
11 A. Say that again.
12 (The record was read back as requested).
13 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
14 Q. In the same time frame, March to June
15 of '93.
16 A. I might have. I don't remember specific
17 discussions but I might have, yes.
18 Q. Can you add context to that?
19 A. Yes. When I first took over I took a look
20 at how the Space Station was being managed. And I
21 was appalled. Nobody was in charge. Everybody was
22 happy. We had three prime contractors which in and
0013
1 of itself is an oxymoron. We had an integrating
2 contractor in Reston which was an artificial
3 organization set up as such. I even had a videotape
4 I saw of the Space Station program manager standing
5 there saying at a meeting in front of 500 people, You
6 would think we organized this program for efficiency,
7 we organized it for political expediency to sell it.
8 Q. Is that Mr. Moorhead?
9 A. No. It was the program manager of the
10 Space Station. He had a beard.
11 Q. Mr. Aldridge?
12 A. No. I can't remember his name. He was one
13 of the second or third program managers of the Space
14 Station. And I could not believe that they went so
15 far and did so little.
16 Then we had a program office here at NASA
17 Headquarters that relied on everyone else to do
18 things. There was no way of managing the program. I
19 called in each of the CEOs and talked to them, and I
20 was appalled by the fact they all were willing to
21 spend government money and they would not let go of
22 Freedom, their subordinates would not let go of
0014
1 Freedom and they didn't obey the basic management
2 Rules 102.
3 So I started, I believe in the summer
4 of '92 exploring options to maybe get people to work
5 together because I didn't see how in the world we
6 were going to be able to recompete to have some
7 approach to have someone take over the program.
8 Q. Prior to the program of '92, that was the
9 genesis of it, the summer of '92?
10 A. Yes. That was the genesis of my concern.
11 But I want to come back and say something else. My
12 shock and utter disgust with everybody involved that
13 was willing to spend money fighting to keep Space
14 Station Freedom going when we were trying to change
15 it.
16 Q. Did Dr. Caporali fight to keep --
17 A. No, the CEOs were above the fray. But I
18 think the people at McDonnell-Douglas fought the
19 hardest to defend Space Station Freedom, the
20 Huntington Beach people at McDonnell-Douglas who by
21 the way of all the contractors were doing the worst
22 job.
0015
1 It was shocking to me. It was shocking how
2 people were willing to spend government money and
3 were only committed to the protection of their
4 empires and their jobs and not committed to the end
5 product for the United States Government. And that
6 is the genesis of the whole process that I went
7 through.
8 Q. You were examining options --
9 A. And from that time on, I openly talked to
10 people about different possibilities.
11 Q. In the summer of '92 you began?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And was it structured? Did you structure
14 it?
15 A. No.
16 Q. How did you do it, just ad hoc?
17 A. People came to see me, I ran into people at
18 different events. I was not closed about it. I was
19 open about it. I was searching for a way that we
20 could build something that was essential to the
21 future of this country to keep it going.
22 Q. Did you talk to Dr. Caporali about it at
0016
1 Grumman?
2 A. About the Space Station program?
3 Q. Yes.
4 A. I am sure I did.
5 Q. Did you talk to Mr. Blyseth?
6 A. Who is Blyseth?
7 Q. Grumman program manager at SSEIC Reston.
8 A. I don't know if I spoke to him.
9 Q. Did you talk to Mr. Kelly at Grumman,
10 Mr. Blyseth's predecessor at Reston?
11 A. I don't know if I spoke to him.
12 Q. Did you talk to Mr. Hayes, Mr. Kelly's
13 predecessor?
14 A. Hayes was not here.
15 Q. The astronaut?
16 A. I don't think Hayes was in charge.
17 Q. That is Apollo 13?
18 A. I met Fred Hayes after Apollo 13.
19 Q. Did you ever recall discussing during
20 this -- were these discussions continuing during the
21 March to June time frame of 1993?
22 A. I don't know. I don't know if they were.
0017
1 But I know over a long period of time I ultimately
2 discussed it.
3 Q. Do you ever recall suggesting to the CEOs
4 or any official of the four Freedom contractors that
5 they submit proposals to take over the program as a
6 single prime contractor?
7 A. At some point in the process I probably did
8 that.
9 Q. Who?
10 A. I would say I know I talked to Boeing about
11 it, and probably to Rockwell about it, and may have
12 talked to Grumman about it, but I don't remember
13 precisely. But I knew for a fact I had talked to
14 Boeing about it.
15 Q. Do you recall talking or receiving a
16 briefing from Grumman concerning an approach to
17 resolving the accountability problem in February
18 1993?
19 A. I don't know, maybe. I had a lot of
20 discussions with a lot of people. I had a lot of
21 discussions, I just don't know.
22 I think there is another person -- no.
0018
1 Q. Who?
2 A. If I could dredge up the name, it is not
3 coming to me.
4 Q. Do you recall who you would have been
5 talking to at Grumman?
6 A. I knew Caporali very well. I knew Pat --
7 and that is a name -- the expert in electro-optics
8 the -- Al Verderossa I knew. Al Verderossa is a
9 super guy and I worked with him while at TRW.
10 Q. Pat Berry?
11 A. That is the guy. I know I talked to Pat
12 Berry in the early years that I was here. Because I
13 was trying to encourage Pat to bid to NASA in the
14 electro-optic area space science and earth science,
15 but I don't recall who I talked to in the space
16 station. I know I talked to Renso Caporali on the
17 Space Station.
18 Q. In what context?
19 A. I know he was in my office a number of
20 times and we talked about the issue of the space
21 station.
22 Q. Would he initiate the visit or would you?
0019
1 A. I don't recall. But I know he was in my
2 office a number of times.
3 Q. What about Boeing. Who would you talk to
4 at Boeing?
5 A. I would talk to Phil Condit, the president,
6 Frank Shrontz, and then they had King, who was the
7 lead executive for the space, government space
8 business at Boeing, and I can't remember King's first
9 name.
10 And then they had a marketing rep, David
11 Knowlen.
12 Q. Who at McDonnell-Douglas?
13 A. Sandy McDonald, or John McDonald.
14 Q. Rockwell?
15 A. John Neal.
16 Q. Did you ever talk to Sam Ichabelis?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Did you ever communicate indirectly with
19 these companies during this time frame, March to June
20 of '93?
21 MR. BRILLIANT: I object to the form of the
22 question.
0020
1 THE WITNESS: I don't understand.
2 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
3 Q. Other than directly, did you communicate
4 with these companies?
5 A. I was a pretty direct open person. And I
6 think in most circumstances I spoke to the people.
7 Many times, I have an expression "Goldin said," the
8 president said, and people started passing messages
9 to accomplish their own objectives, and it didn't
10 take but a short time in Washington to figure out
11 that I have to talk to people and I am an open
12 person.
13 Q. Is Mr. Abbey such a person who would carry
14 out your wishes?
15 A. Let me again, I am trying to define
16 something and you are going in a different
17 direction. My communications, I am a very open
18 person and I communicate openly and directly as
19 possible. And you will have to be specific, it
20 sounds clandestine when you talk about indirect
21 communications.
22 Q. I don't mean to be clandestine. You
0021
1 indicated earlier that you got indications from the
2 White House and Congress indirectly. I mean the same
3 quality of communication. Did you ever use your
4 staff to provide indirect --
5 A. If you call a conversation where the
6 director of the NASA and Johnson Space Center, my
7 subordinate, screamed at me because he had pressure
8 from Congress indirect, I don't do that kind of thing
9 to have somebody deliver a heavy message like that to
10 the best of my recollection.
11 Q. Calling your recollection to the March to
12 June '93 time frame, and during this period I guess
13 Mr. Cohen was the Johnson, I am not referring to
14 Johnson at all. I am referring now to the March to
15 June 1993 time frame. Was there ever a time when you
16 sent Mr. Abbey, who at that time I believe occupied a
17 position in your office, the administrator's office?
18 A. He was the chief of staff.
19 Q. To carry the mail for you to these
20 companies, these three companies, or four companies I
21 have mentioned?
22 MR. BRILLIANT: I object to the form of the
0022
1 question.
2 THE WITNESS: At times I was busy and
3 didn't have the time to talk to somebody, I am sure
4 George Abbey talked to people on my behalf.
5 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
6 Q. Did he have any responsibility for the
7 exploration of options --
8 A. But again, I want to come back and be very
9 clear. Many times people will come in and tell me
10 you gave me that direction, and I say how, and they
11 say I was told Goldin said. It makes me crazy.
12 There is a tendency in government to go to the leader
13 and to have people take what the leader said, pass it
14 along to other human beings and it becomes chiseled
15 into stone as the gospel. And that is what I am
16 resisting, this business about Goldin said.
17 Q. Did Mr. Abbey during this time period I
18 have mentioned, March to June of '93, have any
19 responsibility for the exploration of options,
20 explicit or otherwise?
21 A. Mr. Abbey was the chief of staff of NASA.
22 And it was his job to keep my schedule under control,
0023
1 his job to serve as someone who could control the
2 flow of people into and out of my office. He handled
3 coordination, he certainly handled communications
4 because as with the present arrangement, I can't
5 speak to everything, executives come in and out and
6 talk to him, so there is a lot of communication. Did
7 he have line responsibility? To the best of my
8 recollection, Mr. Abbey had no line responsibility.
9 Did people speak to him and seek advise? Yes, but
10 did he ever have line responsibility, to the best of
11 my recollection no.
12 Q. Or exploring options he had no line
13 responsibility, is that what you are saying?
14 A. We had a team of experts set up to explore
15 options.
16 Q. At the SRT?
17 A. Space Station redesign team, yes. Now, did
18 people talk to him, I presume people talked to him.
19 Did I talk to him, I certainly talked to him all day
20 long.
21 Q. And you gave him --
22 A. Did I ask George Abbey to do things,
0024
1 absolutely.
2 Q. In connection with redesign?
3 A. To correct information, yes, I had
4 questions, I would ask them to go get my questions
5 answered.
6 Q. Would he pass along information on your
7 behalf as well?
8 A. If I was busy and could not get ahold of
9 someone I would ask him to go call on my behalf.
10 Q. Going back for just a moment when we were
11 talking --
12 A. But even Mr. Abbey, I know on circumstances
13 would use my name in vein, as staff people do. So I
14 don't know which circumstances that you are referring
15 to. But it's a major issue in Washington, much more
16 so than the private sector. And I don't say that he
17 did it maliciously, but this is how people get things
18 done. The administrator wants this, the president
19 wants that, even though the administrator or
20 president have not had a say in it.
21 Q. During this period of March to June of '93,
22 while the SRT was developing or doing its work, did
0025
1 you ever seek or obtain information directly from the
2 members of the SRT?
3 A. Sure. I think I got briefings.
4 Q. How frequently?
5 A. I don't know. But I think they were
6 located in Crystal City. I know on a number of
7 occasions because the President had wanted us to
8 explore the Russians being involved. We met, my
9 counter part from Russia would come over and we would
10 meet with the Russians over at Crystal City, go over
11 various options. It was something that only I could
12 work when you are Yuri Koptev came over and I would
13 say I got involved at executive level. I would say
14 they sometimes came to my office and I sometimes went
15 there to get status briefings.
16 Q. Did you ever give direction to members of
17 the station redesign team directly?
18 A. I would say on some occasions my level of
19 technical expertise of value I would give them
20 suggestions.
21 Q. In regard to acquisition approaches, would
22 you do that, did you do that?
0026
1 A. I don't know I could isolate it to specific
2 issues, but I certainly did interact with the team.
3 Q. Can you tell me, the SRT as I understand it
4 was set up in response to a White House request; is
5 that correct?
6 A. That is my recollection.
7 Q. Was that request from Mr. DalBello or
8 Dr. Gibbons?
9 A. I think it came from Dr. Gibbons. I think
10 I had a letter asking us to take a redesign team and
11 we were also asked to form an independent outside
12 review team that was headed up by Chuck Vest at MIT.
13 Those two things were put into place.
14 Q. And the purpose of the SRT was to establish
15 clear lines of authority; is that correct?
16 A. Purpose of the space station redesign team
17 was to resurrect the program that had died. That was
18 the purpose of that team. Very single mindfully the
19 Space Station Freedom was dead, though some
20 contractors said we don't listen to the President of
21 the United States, and this is not at the executive
22 level but, across the board they said we know what is
0027
1 important to our corporation and we will keep that
2 program going. The purpose of the redesign team was
3 to figure out how this nation could build an
4 affordable space station and not spend another ten
5 years and 10 billion dollars filling the fat coffers
6 of corporations that were not stepping up to the
7 task. That was the purpose of the redesign team.
8 Q. Now, you addressed the purpose of the
9 SRT --
10 A. You know sometimes we look through
11 different telescopes. Sometimes the telescopes are
12 pointed at the strength of the nation and sometimes
13 pointed at the strength of the corporations.
14 Q. You spoke at the kickoff to the SRT. Do
15 you recall that speech?
16 A. No. But I know I talked to them.
17 Q. Do you recall speaking about the necessity
18 to establish clear lines of authority in the program?
19 A. Oh, yes. Let me go back for context. We
20 had three prime contractors who had tasks that they
21 were doing that were completely mixed up. One
22 contractor was building things for other contractors,
0028
1 were then building things and sending back to other
2 contractors. There was no way of figuring out who
3 was in charge. We had an integration team who had
4 good people and good leadership and didn't have
5 authority. All they were allowed to do was
6 integration but not leadership in management.
7 Then we had a management team who was not
8 even located with the integration team in Washington,
9 who was responsible but also didn't have the
10 authority they needed because the Senate directives
11 would go directly to the congressional delegations to
12 get the resources that they needed. There was no
13 clear lines of authority and no clear lines of
14 responsibility, yes, that is correct.
15 What I am trying to convey to you is a very
16 important point. I know you want to go for a
17 specific piece of information. There was absolute
18 disorder and chaos, and the inmates were running the
19 asylum, and they forgot who the President of the
20 United States was and they forgot who the American
21 people were, and everybody was vying for their own
22 piece of the pie. And I had to come into this
0029
1 because I had to put my hand on the Bible in the Oval
2 Office and straighten out this mess, and you cannot
3 straighten out this kind of a mess with nice meetings
4 with teacups and doilies, with nice letters of
5 delegation. It was ugly, it was miserable, it was
6 problematic, but it was without malice of
7 forethought.
8 Q. I appreciate that, and I also appreciate
9 your openness. I would like to try to wrap this up
10 as fast as I can, so if I could try to limit this --
11 A. But I want you to know, I openly want to
12 tell you I am emotional about this and I want to tell
13 you why I am emotional --
14 Q. We are on the same page.
15 I want you to know why I am emotional.
16 Because eight years went by and none of these great
17 corporations, none of them came to the president and
18 said, "Mr. President we are in trouble let's work
19 together to fix it."
20 When the President of the United States
21 said I want the system redesigned, everybody went to
22 suck the blood of the program to keep the old program
0030
1 going. And I think it was not a proud moment for
2 America. And then when I was given the job -- and I
3 want to finish because you have asked me questions,
4 and I want to talk. When I was given the job, I went
5 up to the Hill. I was called all sorts of names. My
6 integrity was ripped apart, why? Because I did what
7 the President of the United States asked me, and the
8 contractors were angry, and I say contractors plural.
9 Q. I want to move this as fast as I can
10 because I know your time is at a premium, and I do
11 appreciate the context and I appreciate how you feel
12 and I am on the same page as you with regard to the
13 program. And I believe I may be able to show you a
14 briefing that we, Grumman, gave you indicating that
15 we agreed with the fact the program needed fixing.
16 Now, I want to go back to the SRT --
17 A. Because the reason I said that is that in
18 all these questions you are leading to, you are
19 looking for some order in this and some nice smooth
20 set of business operations. And I want to tell you
21 is it was a chaotic time and given the chaos, it is
22 difficult to go to individual events and because I am
0031
1 open I talk to a lot of people. Because I talk to a
2 lot the people take what I say, and you know the game
3 of telephone you have with children, it gets a huge
4 amount of distortions. And there is a problem in
5 communication. And that is the context I am saying
6 this, and I am going to try to calm down. But to me,
7 it is my life. This is my life, this program. And I
8 gave up my position in industry because I was so
9 worried about this, and I didn't, not at the CEO
10 level, they were terrific, but as you went down in
11 the organization self interest entered in and that is
12 what gives me my emotion.
13 Q. I want to go back to the SRT which was a
14 fairly structured process. And part of that
15 structure was a redesign effort to meet budget and
16 time guidelines accountability, correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Now, as I understand it, part of it was --
19 A. Or let me come back. Again, the purpose of
20 the redesign was to redesign it technically, to
21 redesign it programmatically, and then to redesign it
22 structurally to bring in a new partner. And to
0032
1 redesign it to incorporate new ways of doing
2 business. And finally to have clear authority and
3 responsibility and get the government out of this
4 incredible integrating loop and industry.
5 And by the way, I want to go back and say I
6 was not just frustrated with industry, but I was
7 frustrated with government and myself. As hard as I
8 was on everybody else, I was harder on myself because
9 I felt I could not move as fast as I should have.
10 Q. So in the course of this work that the SRT
11 was to do that you just described, one of the items
12 was to come up for options for the White House to
13 consider?
14 A. I think the White House asked us to come up
15 with three options if I recollect correctly either in
16 writing or in desire they wanted us to take a look at
17 three distinctly different options, option A, B and C
18 and we were to fill in the blanks.
19 Q. And you were to fill in the options
20 themselves or did they give you the options?
21 A. No, we were to fill it in.
22 Q. And the SRT was to evaluate the technical
0033
1 merits of each of these options?
2 A. I think they would come up with the options
3 and then evaluate them.
4 Q. But were they to develop costs associated
5 with each option as well?
6 A. I believe so.
7 Q. Were they given budget guidelines within
8 which to work?
9 A. I think we have initial guidelines that
10 just fell by the way side.
11 Q. You mean in March of '93?
12 A. Yes. Because they were much too tight.
13 Much too optimistic. We came up with the three
14 options but above the desired course targets for each
15 option.
16 Q. Even by June of '93?
17 A. I don't know the time frame, but I know
18 when the dust settled, when the work was done that
19 the costs we came up with were much less than Space
20 Station Freedom but more than our initial course
21 targets.
22 Q. And can you put a time line --
0034
1 A. No, I can't put a time line, but I do
2 remember that.
3 Q. Was this SRT effort, was that a clean sheet
4 of paper or did they start to have a baseline to
5 start from?
6 A. I think it was a variation. My
7 recollection is one of the options is -- let me
8 define my terms. On one extreme they took a look at
9 reassembling some of the building blocks that were
10 thought of Space Station Freedom. So there was one
11 that was very close to Space Station Freedom, and
12 then one deviated more, and then one deviated
13 radically. That is my recollection, I don't know
14 whether you call that a clean sheet of paper.
15 Q. But that is what the SRT came up with?
16 A. A range,yes.
17 Q. Was this the extent of the independence of
18 the SRT in developing this option was what in your
19 understanding?
20 A. I think we have a pretty open process
21 here. Remember, we also had this parallel group
22 going with them, the Vest panel that we were
0035
1 reviewing and giving guidance. They brought in
2 experts to make comment. They called me in and asked
3 my comments. I gave them mine. But we wanted them
4 to have freedom to go do the right thing.
5 Q. Do you recall the extent to which the
6 acquisition strategy that was associated with the
7 redesign team work, strategy or strategies was the
8 extent to which it was an open process?
9 A. I remember more about the technical
10 approach. I remember less about the acquisition
11 approach. I think I was more into the technical
12 approach than on the acquisition approach. But I
13 know I was involved.
14 Q. Do you recall the extent to which the
15 contractors, and when I say contractors, I mean the
16 four Freedom contractors at any level were involved
17 in the technical redesign activities at the SRT?
18 A. I think that they had a process where they
19 called the teams of the different contractors in
20 either separately or collectively on a regular basis
21 to review what was being done.
22 Q. And to brief the SRT?
0036
1 A. That is my recollection.
2 Q. Do you recall if a similar process was
3 being carried forward with regard to the acquisition
4 strategy?
5 A. I thought everything was discussed at these
6 meetings. That is my recollection.
7 Q. Did you have any discussion about the
8 acquisition strategy with Ms. Lee, the associate
9 administrator for procurement?
10 A. Deidre Lee. I think she was in charge of
11 it. Or no, what was she then. She was head of the
12 procurement.
13 Q. Associate administration.
14 A. And as such she would have been reviewing
15 the acquisition strategy. And I know I met with her
16 on a regular basis. I don't remember any of the
17 meetings, but I presume we would have talked about
18 the acquisition.
19 MR. ESHELMAN: Let me ask the reporter to
20 mark this as Exhibit 248.
21 (Exhibit No. 248
22 marked for identification.)
0037
1 THE WITNESS: Oh, these are the people they
2 consulted with, the advisers.
3 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
4 Q. With regard to acquisition strategy, do you
5 recall who was in charge at the Station Redesign
6 Team?
7 A. I don't know.
8 Q. Does Ms. McInerney ring a bell?
9 A. I think she came out of the procurement
10 organization. I can't say for sure.
11 Q. Did you appoint Colonel O'Connor to be the
12 acting head of the redesign team as shown here on
13 this Exhibit 248?
14 A. I think so. I am not sure. I am not 100
15 percent sure.
16 Q. Did you ever have any discussions with
17 Colonel O'Connor concerning the acquisition strategy?
18 A. I don't remember any -- he was head of the
19 redesign team, so I probably had discussions with
20 him.
21 Q. How frequently would you have discussions
22 with him?
0038
1 A. I don't remember. I saw Ed O'Brien all the
2 time.
3 Q. Here at Headquarters or in Crystal City?
4 A. He came to brief me on a variety of
5 subjects, and I would be at Crystal City.
6 Q. Would you be there in addition to times the
7 Russians were there?
8 A. Yes. 9 Q. How frequently?
10 A. I don't recollect. But again, this was a
11 time we were in a real tight time crunch and didn't
12 have time to do things in the normal order.
13 Q. Did also talk to Dr. Walter Brooks?
14 A. Sure, he was from NASA Ames.
15 Q. Did you talk to him about this?
16 A. Again --
17 Q. And by this I mean the acquisition
18 strategy?
19 A. I can't separate out in my mind acquisition
20 strategy from redesign, from the science that had to
21 be done. We had multiple interactions at multiple
22 times.
0039
1 Q. We've had a lot of testimony in this case
2 from both Ms. McInerney who was reported to Ms. Lee,
3 and from Colonel O'Connor to the effect that the
4 acquisition strategy being done by the SRT was to
5 remain sensitive information and not to be
6 distributed as openly as the other information that
7 the SRT was considering.
8 Was that your understanding at that time?
9 MR. BRILLIANT: I object to the question to
10 the fact it characterizes other witness' testimony.
11 But no problem with the bottom line question at the
12 end of the way it was presented.
13 MR. ESHELMAN: Before you answer the
14 question, let me go and give you a quotation from
15 Colonel O'Connor's deposition.
16 MR. BRILLIANT: What page is that on?
17 MR. ESHELMAN: Page 30. Or you can get out
18 Ms. McInerney too and go to page 463 in
19 Ms. McInerney's, where she stays, "The whole
20 procurement approval was covered with kid gloves.
21 They wanted to retain the sensitivity of the
22 procurement approach as long as possible." That is
0040
1 from page 463.
2 Dee Lee, the associate administrator
3 testified that they were not to have any contact with
4 the contractor community, from page 46 of Ms. Lee's
5 deposition.
6 Colonel O'Connor testified as follows:
7 "Question, But does that conform to your
8 understanding of the level of sensitivity with which
9 information and the SRT was to be handled regarding
10 acquisition?
11 Answer, Acquisition, yes, as to
12 acquisition, right.
13 Question, So it was to be treated more
14 highly sensitive than the other information.
15 Answer, Yes.
16 Question, Why was that?
17 Answer, Probably because my memory of why
18 it was treated differently was because by the nature
19 it involved a lot of people's jobs and created a heck
20 of a lot more excitement in the public domain with
21 Congressional people and the press than most of these
22 other things we were doing on that team. What we
0041
1 were trying to do was to protect it until we had the
2 chance to integrate it and come to conclusions and
3 present results just because by the nature of it it
4 had to with contracts."
5 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
6 Q. Now, my question is, was that your
7 understanding at the time?
8 A. My recollection is just a little different,
9 and I will provide context for it.
10 In a normal source evaluation that NASA
11 did, that you cannot violate the procurement process
12 because there were very strict rules involved and we
13 would abide by them. And when there is a specific
14 source selection we abide by those rules.
15 Here we were trying to come up with a
16 process which is different. We were trying to come
17 up with a process as opposed to coming up with a
18 source selection. In coming up with that process
19 there were a lot of people coming in and interacting
20 and talking about it, because we were trying to get
21 the very best information we could.
22 Did we want to be discrete? As discrete as
0042
1 possible, but the normal rules and regulations for
2 government procurement did not apply in my mind at
3 this time, and we wanted to be as discrete as
4 possible. That is my recollection.
5 Q. And did you communicate that understanding
6 to either Colonel O'Connor, Ms. McInerney or Ms. Lee?
7 A. I don't remember the specifics, the
8 discussions. But certainly there was a desire to be
9 a little bit more discrete, but there was a lot of
10 input coming in, and there were a lot of people
11 involved, and there was not as specific procurement
12 going on, other than trying to come up with a
13 process. And yes, there was certainly a sensitivity
14 because that was one of the things that was driving
15 this whole business about why people wanted to retain
16 Space Station Freedom. Because at that point in time
17 when NASA would award a contract, the first thing
18 quoted was how many jobs were involved. Now when
19 NASA awards contracts we no longer talk about that,
20 so we were going through a culture change which was
21 different.
22 Q. Before March 1993 had you or Mr. Abbey or
0043
1 anyone else at NASA come up with design options for
2 the station?
3 A. Before March of '93?
4 Q. Correct.
5 A. I can tell you that I did.
6 Q. When?
7 A. Sometime in February. And I had asked when
8 the Space Station was canceled, I begged for a week
9 to try to resurrect it. And I asked the White House
10 to give us a chance to see if we could save the Space
11 Station. And through their trust and good offices
12 they gave us a week. And during that time there were
13 a number of people who would fly into Washington and
14 we were all up for one week straight and came up with
15 a number of options, three options as I recollect,
16 and presented it to the White House.
17 Q. Who came in?
18 A. Max Faget, Tom Stafford.
19 Q. He was with NASA at that point?
20 A. No, he E did a pro bono. The station was
21 at risk. We went to general quarters. George Abbey
22 was involved, there were five or six other people.
0044
1 There was no one in the world as good as Max Faget.
2 He was one of the major contractors.
3 Q. Where did you meet?
4 A. We met in Olde Town Alexandria.
5 Q. Where in Olde Town?
6 A. In a loft somewhere. We were very
7 concerned that if word got out the Space Station was
8 being canceled it would be the end of the program.
9 So again we tried to do it as discretely as possible
10 with no real rules.
11 Q. Who owned the loft?
12 A. I think Tom Stafford.
13 Q. Does he still live in Olde Town?
14 A. I don't know. I think so. No, he lives
15 all over the country, I don't know.
16 Q. Do you remember an entity called the
17 requirements team?
18 A. No. I don't recollect that right now.
19 Q. Do you remember Mr. Weatherbee?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Was Jim Weatherbee there?
22 A. Yes.
0045
1 Q. Do you remember what his function was
2 during this period, March to June of '93?
3 A. I think Jim Weatherbee did an analysis of
4 Space Station Freedom and found that the control
5 system didn't work.
6 Q. Did you, was that analysis done in his
7 official duties?
8 A. I don't know about official. Remember, we
9 were on the verge of losing --
10 Q. Did he work for NASA at the time?
11 A. Yes, he was an astronaut.
12 Q. Still with NASA?
13 A. Yes. And assigned to perform an analysis I
14 think he was back in Crystal City. My recollection
15 is that he was in Crystal City.
16 Q. Do you recall whether or not --
17 A. I don't know whether he came before or
18 after the redesign team. But I do know that he was
19 asked to come back to Washington and to take a look
20 at the critical sub systems on the Space Station
21 Freedom and to see how they worked, how applicable
22 they were to reactivation. And my recollection is
0046
1 that he found a major design flaw.
2 Q. Did he work with Bill Shepherd?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do you recall their organization?
5 A. No. But I know he and Shepherd worked
6 together.
7 Q. I would represent to you that Captain
8 Shepherd testified you addressed a small group in
9 March of 1993 that was supposed to come up with an
10 idea what the space station should be, on page 24 and
11 25 of his deposition. And he was given two weeks in,
12 Weatherbee, two weeks to come up with a written
13 report, and they were called the requirements
14 assessment group. Does that refresh your
15 recollection?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Captain Shepherd said that he was chosen
18 for that position by Mr. Abbey. Does that refresh
19 your recollection?
20 A. I think George Abbey may have suggested
21 Shepherd and Jim Weatherbee as having capability to
22 support the redesign activity.
0047
1 Q. And that was done -- did you ask him for
2 those recommendations?
3 A. I don't remember the sequence of events.
4 MR. ESHELMAN: I ask this be marked as
5 Exhibit 249.
6 (Exhibit No. 249
7 marked for identification.)
8 MR. ESHELMAN: I direct your attention,
9 Mr. Goldin to a document that was just marked as
10 Exhibit 249.
11 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
12 Q. Have you seen the first page which is Bates
13 number 1587 before?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Does this refresh your recollection as to
16 the Requirements Assessment Group?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Let's look at the second page, Bates 1588.
19 Do you recall receiving this information from
20 Weatherbee, Mr. Weatherbee?
21 A. Is there a date on this?
22 Q. I direct your attention to the fax date
0048
1 stamp,April 13, 1993.
2 A. No, this doesn't. I don't know what they
3 are evaluating. I don't know the context for this.
4 It looks like this is an evaluation of some
5 presentations that were made, and I don't know the
6 context of the presentations.
7 Q. Do you recall why Mr. Weatherbee would be
8 evaluating, why you requested him to perform this?
9 A. I don't know that I requested him to
10 perform this. I just don't remember the context of
11 this.
12 Q. I recall that Mr. Shepherd or Captain
13 Shepherd testified that you had tasked them to come
14 up with ideas within two weeks. Was this a part of
15 that? 16 A. I don't know.
17 Q. Let me go to Captain Shepherd --
18 A. Again, I want to come back and say, I was
19 doing a lot of things at this time, one of which was
20 this presentation, one of which was spending a lot of
21 time in Congress. If you remember, this is the time
22 period when we won the Space Station by one vote. I
0049
1 was spending a huge amount of time on the Hill. I
2 did not have an orderly process. I was up 20 hours a
3 day, so I just don't recollect the context. I am not
4 trying to be evasive, I just don't recall.
5 Q. I recognize the difficulty and I appreciate
6 the effort you are making.
7 As part of the milieu, for lack of a better
8 term, at this time, March to June of '93, did you
9 have discussions with Captain Shepherd?
10 A. March to June?
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. I know I had discussions with Captain
13 Shepherd when he was back here. I don't know if it
14 is exactly the March to June time frame. But I
15 remember he was back here, he was located in Crystal
16 City, and that I would go over to Crystal City from
17 time to time to see him and talk with him. I know
18 that is a fact.
19 Q. Did you ever discuss the progress of the
20 SRT with him?
21 A. I don't remember the details of the
22 discussion, but I do know I talked to him.
0050
1 Q. He testified previously that he had talked
2 or met with you frequently, Mr. Abbey, Mr. Peterson,
3 Mr. Weatherbee and Colonel O'Connor to discuss the
4 SRT progress, the progress of the SRT what they were
5 doing?
6 A. I could say it is possible, I am just not
7 recollecting.
8 Q. Just for the record Mr. Brilliant that is
9 at 278 and 279 of Captain Shepherd's deposition.
10 Do you remember that Captain Shepherd was
11 head of the station, the transition team, Space
12 Station transition team?
13 A. No, I don't recollect.
14 Q. Do you recall who appointed the transition
15 team?
16 A. I don't even remember the transition team
17 and I certainly don't remember any appointments.
18 Q. Captain Shepherd had testified that you,
19 Mr. Goldin had requested him to come to Washington to
20 head the transition team, do you recall that?
21 A. This may have been -- again, it is
22 supposition, people say Goldin wants you to do it,
0051
1 Goldin requested it. Maybe I did, maybe I didn't.
2 But I certainly have tremendous regard for Bill
3 Shepherd. I think he is an outstanding engineer, he
4 is a Navy seal, he is tough and does the right
5 things. I just don't have the recollection that I
6 did it directly or that someone asked him to come in
7 my name, I don't know.
8 Q. Just for the record he testified on page 47
9 of his deposition that it was the direct request from
10 you.
11 A. Okay, I don't know. I just don't know, I
12 don't recollect.
13 Q. He also testified that Mr. Abbey was
14 involved in transition. Do you recall that?
15 MR. BRILLIANT: Where is that?
16 MR. ESHELMAN: Page 63.
17 THE WITNESS: Transition from what.
18 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
19 Q. From Freedom to alpha at this time. This
20 is after the SRT.
21 A. That I don't recollect.
22 Q. He also testified that Weatherbee was
0052
1 involved in asking him to head the transition, also
2 at 63.
3 What was Mr. Weatherbee's role on the Space
4 Station in your understanding?
5 A. What I remember is, he did a brilliant
6 analysis with Bill Shepherd on the control system.
7 That is the thing that I retained.
8 Q. In two weeks?
9 A. I don't know in two weeks, but I remember
10 he did it an analysis of the control system which I
11 thought at the time was a critical finding that was
12 crucial to the design of the system. That is my
13 recollection of what he did. Now, I am sure he did
14 more, but that stands out in my mind as something he
15 did.
16 Q. Control system is technical, correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Who, of the four contractors under Freedom
19 would be responsible for that system?
20 A. I don't know.
21 Q. Initially at least?
22 A. I don't know, I think they were all
0053
1 involved in some way.
2 Q. Do you have any recollection of
3 Mr. Shepherd asking you for a writing appointing him
4 to his position?
5 A. A what?
6 Q. A writing, memorandum or letter?
7 A. No.
8 Q. You don't recall approving the members of
9 the transition team?
10 A. I don't recollect that.
11 Q. Captain Shepherd said that he provided
12 lists for your approval at page 76, Exhibit 232.
13 Did you ever discuss the transition
14 progress with Captain Shepherd?
15 A. I don't know. I know I talked to him, I
16 know I met with him. I don't remember what I talked
17 to him about.
18 Q. Do you recall a meeting with him at Crystal
19 City?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Do you recall where at Crystal City?
22 A. No. There were a couple of offices in
0054
1 Crystal City and I don't remember which ones.
2 Q. Would you have dinner with him at Crystal
3 City?
4 A. Yes. There were long hours and
5 occasionally I would go over and have dinner.
6 Q. Did Mr. Abbey go with you?
7 A. Yes. I think he was there sometimes too.
8 Q. How frequently would you go?
9 A. I don't know. I don't remember. But I
10 know I went.
11 Q. Do you recall the discussion that you had
12 with Mr. Shepherd or Captain Shepherd about the need
13 to establish clear lines for the a accountability of
14 the program?
15 A. I don't remember a discussion with
16 Shepherd. But I remember that I felt it was very
17 important that open lines of authority for the
18 reasons I stated about an hour ago.
19 And by the way, the things I have said to
20 you I have said openly. I said it in open talks and
21 discussions, I expressed my concern about the
22 organization of the Space Station.
0055
1 Q. Did the conversations --
2 A. By the way, there was no deep dark secret
3 that I felt we would have clear lines of authority.
4 Now I don't recollect specifically saying that to
5 Mr. Shepherd. But I do know I said those things.
6 Q. The substance of the conversations at those
7 meetings was principally about redesign and
8 transition?
9 A. Which meetings?
10 Q. With Mr. Shepherd, Captain Shepherd and his
11 people in Crystal City?
12 A. I don't remember. There were times we went
13 to dinner, not as the administrator and subordinates,
14 but as people working on a common activity. There
15 were other times when I was the administrator and I
16 went through the hierarchy. Given the time
17 compressions that we had, I don't know how to
18 separate out these different circumstances. And it
19 is hard for me to bring up a specific conversation or
20 specific discussion given all the things that were
21 going on. So I don't know how to get at the
22 specifics of the question.
0056
1 Q. Captain Shepherd testified at those dinners
2 you discussed restructuring transition, he did
3 testify that way. Do you believe he is correct at
4 this time?
5 A. If I don't have a recollection I don't know
6 how to validate if.
7 Q. Would be afair characterization to say you
8 were pretty involved in the entire process?
9 A. I think that is fair.
10 Q. Hands onsort of involvement?
11 A. Well, I was involved -- let me put it this
12 way -- I was involved more in that process than any
13 other at NASA but certainly not to the point where I
14 was working on it 20 hours a day seven days a week.
15 I was running the agency as a subset and we had Bryan
16 O'Connor and then whoever helped at various times.
17 So I was not the Space Station designer. I was the
18 NASA administrator. I was involved in that more than
19 others. But it was a fraction of my time, the lion
20 share of my time at that point in time was being
21 spent restructuring NASA.
22 Q. NASA itself?
0057
1 A. NASA itself and working up on Capitol Hill
2 to keep the program going.
3 Q. But you would provide direction?
4 A. I went over and interacted and had
5 discussions. I would not characterize it as
6 directions.
7 Q. Would you characterize it as principally
8 being a passive receiver of information?
9 A. No. It was more than passive, I
10 interacted. One of the things I try to do, I said
11 don't look upon me as the NASA administrator. Look
12 at me as a NASA engineer.
13 Because in many circumstances when I sat in
14 the room with people it is overwhelming to sit in the
15 room and have the NASA administrator there and they
16 take it as direction. And I was going to try to help
17 people through the process. So there were blurry
18 lines. Some people would take it as direction, my
19 intent was not to have that, but with few exceptions
20 and I knew what those exceptions were, and the words
21 that got didn't come through the informal discussion
22 officially. I wanted to have real lines of
0058
1 authority.
2 Q. And can you put a time frame on the
3 meetings?
4 A. Do you understand what I am saying?
5 Q. I think so.
6 Could you put a time frame on the meetings
7 that you had these proceeded through the remainder of
8 1993?
9 A. I don't know.
10 Q. Third quarter?
11 A. I just don't have a sense about time.
12 Q. Mr. Shepherd testified that he was
13 reporting directly to you through the period of
14 transition, the entirety. Do you recollect that?
15 A. No, I don't.
16 Q. That would be September to October of '93,
17 those 60 days, September to October?
18 A. I just don't recollect.
19 Q. You indicated earlier today that you knew
20 Dr. Brooks?
21 A. I didn't know him well but I knew who he
22 was, yes.
0059
1 Q. Do you recall that he worked on the SRT
2 independent of the exhibit that I just showed you?
3 A. I have a recollection of Dr. Brooks as a
4 man with a beard and curly hair, deep voice, and
5 someone who I didn't know well, but he was there in
6 Crystal City and I talked with him.
7 Q. You met with him there in Crystal City?
8 A. Again, I want to be sure you understand. I
9 didn't sit down and have formal meetings with Walt
10 Brooks. I went over to Crystal City. These people
11 were working day and night. A leader needs to make
12 sure his people know they are with him. I went over
13 not to meet with them one on one and give them
14 direction one on won.
15 Instead of having dinner with my wife I had
16 dinner with them because I wanted them to know I was
17 in the trenches with them. I was there more as part
18 of morale, to let them understand my design, I have
19 done it for 35 years, that is why I was there. And
20 in that context did I meet Walter Brooks, certainly I
21 had talks with him. But I want to be clear, I didn't
22 have, my recollection specifically meeting with him.
0060
1 There was an open area and we would sit and talk and
2 sometimes get in the room and talk.
3 Q. Do you recall having dinner with him at
4 Crystal City?
5 A. I don't have recollection -- I had dinner
6 with a lot of people, but I don't remember if I
7 remember having dinner with Walt Brooks. I do
8 remember Shepherd, not necessarily Brooks.
9 Q. Dr. Brooks testified that he did have
10 several meetings with you. This is at page 102 of
11 this deposition, and in those meetings you stressed
12 the need to eliminate Reston. Do you recall that?
13 A. Oh, absolutely. Reston being a name for
14 this artificial organization that was created.
15 Q. That would be Level II?
16 A. Yes, Level II.
17 Q. Do you remember --
18 A. And by the way, you don't have to go for
19 that Walter Brooks discussion, I openly talked about
20 it.
21 Q. This is just by way of refreshing your
22 recollection?
0061
1 A. But I want you to know I openly talked
2 about it, because what we did, we had people who
3 managed people who managed people and there was no
4 accountability and responsibility. And I openly
5 talked about it. I was not being directed, but I was
6 pointing out a problem that I saw.
7 Q. I recognize the challenge that your job at
8 this time represents. I also recognize the challenge
9 it currently represents. I am only trying to refresh
10 your recollection so we can move this along and get
11 you back to work sooner for the American people.
12 A. But again, I want to make sure you
13 understand, it had nothing to do with any particular
14 concern about the company in Reston. It had nothing
15 to do with the people in Reston. It was a management
16 inefficiency.
17 Q. Do you remember --
18 A. Please, I want to finish. There was a
19 management inefficiency put in there as declared in
20 front of 500 people by the manager of the
21 international Space Station. It was a political
22 nicety to win votes.
0062
1 Q. Do you recall Dr. Brooks objecting to any
2 loss of the institutional knowledge developed in
3 Reston, by going forward in the program?
4 A. No, I don't remember.
5 Q. Do you remember Captain Shepherd
6 recommending Dr. Brooks for the transition team after
7 the SRT completed its job?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Do you remember discussing Dr. Brooks with
10 Captain Shepherd?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Do you remember discussing with Captain
13 Shepherd the composition of the transition team at
14 all?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Do you remember a memorandum that
17 Dr. Brooks signed with three other NASA employees
18 that he gave to Colonel O'Connor questioning the
19 final report of the SRT?
20 A. No.
21 MR. ESHELMAN: I ask the reporter to mark
22 this as Exhibit 250.
0063
1 (Exhibit No. 250
2 marked for identification.)
3 MR. ESHELMAN: I show you a document marked
4 as Exhibit 250.
5 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
6 Q. Do you remember who these people are who
7 signed this document?
8 A. John O'Neill, I know John. He is an
9 outstanding guy. He ended up running some major
10 company down in Houston, and just retired because he
11 had a heart problem. I can't read any --
12 Q. Walter Brooks?
13 A. I know him. Who are the two?
14 Q. John Cox and Michael Griffin.
15 A. John Cox, sure, he has a beard, and I think
16 he has a limp.
17 And Mike Griffin yes, I knew him. He left
18 NASA.
19 Q. Just to keep the record clean, Dr. Cox,
20 John Cox doesn't have a beard or walk with a limp.
21 A. Then I have the wrong guy.
22 Q. John Cox, Dr. Cox followed Mr. Moorhead as
0064
1 the Freedom program man as Reston.
2 A. Then I have him confused with someone else,
3 I am sorry.
4 Q. Do you recall seeing this memorandum around
5 the time?
6 A. Let me read it.
7 (Brief pause in proceedings).
8 THE WITNESS: There is always dissent, I
9 don't remember that. Probably a bunch of other
10 letters addressing concern. When you have a large
11 team others don't agree.
12 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
13 Q. There are other letters than this that you
14 know of?
15 A. I am sure.
16 Q. Are you aware of any specific ones?
17 A. No, but I see this all the time.
18 Q. Do you remember discussing the contents of
19 this with anyone?
20 A. I don't recollect. It doesn't look
21 unusual.
22 Q. Dr. Brooks, if we look at -- look at 248,
0065
1 he is the program manager head, fairly responsible
2 position; is that correct?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do you often see these kinds of objections
5 from people at that level?
6 A. Sure.
7 Q. In this organization?
8 A. Sure. Sometimes the program manager
9 doesn't like things. This is a very open
10 organization and you can't have -- when you lead you
11 can't have one hundred percent consensus, and in an
12 organization with 20,000 people and an organization
13 with ten managers, two out of ten disagree, it
14 happens.
15 Q. Do you recall a Saturday meeting with Mal
16 Peterson to discuss this?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Meeting lasted some 14 hours?
19 A. I don't recollect it.
20 Q. Did you have an opinion of Dr. Brooks at
21 this time, June of '93?
22 MR. BRILLIANT: I object to the form of the
0066
1 question.
2 THE WITNESS: I told you my recollection of
3 Walter Brooks.
4 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
5 Q. And it has not changed?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Has it always been consistently that way?
8 A. Yes. Seemed like a competent fellow.
9 Again, I want to come back because I think
10 it is important that you understood. Sitting here in
11 the antiseptic area of the legal department and
12 looking at a memo seeing a protest is one thing. But
13 when you lead a large dynamic organization, there
14 will always be people who disagree. There will
15 always be people who agree. And if you sit around --
16 and that was one of the problems with Space Station
17 Freedom.
18 They would look for consensus and they
19 would wait until consensus and you could not get a
20 decision made, and things didn't happen. And you
21 take a look at things, the people involved take a
22 look and make a decision and then you agree or
0067
1 disagree. You give a chance for the system to be
2 vetted, people make their case and move on.
3 Q. Do you recall meeting with Colonel O'Connor
4 and you and Mr. Abbey meeting with Colonel O'Connor
5 as part of a regular routine during the SRT every
6 morning?
7 A. I remember meeting with Colonel O'Connor on
8 a regular basis, Bryan O'Connor.
9 Q. Right.
10 A. I don't know it was every day. I don't
11 think it could be every day because I was traveling
12 and going up to the Hill. But certainly I believe I
13 met with Bryan O'Connor on a periodic basis.
14 Q. In the mornings and evenings as well?
15 A. I don't know the times. But I know I met
16 with him.
17 Q. Would it be fair to say you met with him
18 four or five times a week?
19 A. I don't recollect it. It would be fair to
20 say I met are him on a regular basis.
21 Q. I want to quote to you from pages 47 and 48
22 of Colonel O'Connor's deposition, just a short quote,
0068
1 Colonel O'Connor said, "I feel like both he," meaning
2 Mr. Abbey, "and Mr. Goldin did have direct influence
3 on the restructure Space Station and that they were
4 the ones that came up with a whole plan to do the
5 restructuring in the first place. They were
6 intimately involved in setting up the team and
7 creating the team membership soon on, but I met with
8 them and talked with them almost every day."
9 Does that conform with your recollection?
10 A. Let's go back and see what I said. The
11 White House canceled the Space Station. I begged
12 them, all this work is theoretical if the Space
13 Station is dead. I begged them to give us a chance
14 to come up with some options. We went off for a week
15 which is what they gave us and came up with three
16 options. They said okay, why don't we give it a
17 shot.
18 Q. Do you recall how these three options you
19 came up with in Olde Town compared to the three that
20 the SRT ultimately --
21 A. Let me finish what I wanted to say and then
22 you can ask me questions.
0069
1 That ended up being the starting point, and
2 I think Bryan O'Connor may have been on that team and
3 he referred to, in Olde Town.
4 Q. But it is consistent though?
5 A. There was a team of people in Olde Town, I
6 am not sure it was mine or George's, but a team of
7 people trying to save the Space Station who served as
8 a starting point for the redesign team.
9 Q. Do you recall who assembled that team in
10 Olde Town?
11 A. I think everybody helped.
12 Q. Everybody being who?
13 A. People involved. I called someone and said
14 oh my God, someone I trusted, we have a problem, who
15 do you think ought to do it. They called a few
16 people, they talked to each other, and there was a
17 process that just kind of happened.
18 Q. But it was important it be a confidential
19 process, I think you testified, correct?
20 A. Oh, yes, sure.
21 Q. So how did
you control the confidentiality?
22 A. The first person I talked to was George
0070
1 Abbey,who I trust. I think the second person George
2 talked to, the first person he talked to was Tom
3 Stafford, who he trusted. And then I don't remember
4 how it went from there. But it works like any
5 system. The Space Station was dead, it was dead, it
6 was not a question of how we would move jobs around.
7 It was dead and we had one week to resurrect it. We
8 didn't have a chance to have all these nice formal
9 things occur. And we did the best we could, came up
10 with three options. Bryan indicated it started with
11 those three options. There was an interactive
12 process.
13 Q. Was Mr. Abbey the functional spark plug,
14 put it that way for this Olde Town thing or did you
15 pretty much --
16 A. I don't know. It is something that just
17 kind of happened, just happened. George Abbey
18 certainly knew -- by the way, I hardly knew George
19 Abbey at the time. But I was introduced to him and
20 he knew the corporate history of NASA, he knew
21 people, and I decided I would trust George Abbey's
22 judgment on meeting people. I didn't know most of
0071
1 these people. I think that's when I first met
2 Max Faget and perhaps some of these other people.
3 And people knew people and they trusted each other as
4 a core and we did the best we could.
5 Q. So to get back to my question, it was
6 Colonel O'Connor's recollection is consistent?
7 A. The first part is consistent that he had a
8 starting point. He may have been involved in.
9 Giving me all the credit for that, I think is, I
10 would love to take it because I am very proud of it.
11 But I can't except credit for that. Max Faget was a
12 creative genius behind those three options. He is
13 the most brilliant space system designer in the
14 world.
15 Q. Now, those --
16 A. If I have to think through it, I would give
17 the creative genius to Max Faget.
18 Q. Those three options developed in
19 Alexandria, were they the same three that ultimately
20 came out of the SRT?
21 A. I don't know, I don't remember. I think
22 there was one of them that was the same. But that
0072
1 was option C. Option C was single launch. Options A
2 and B are very fuzzy in my mind. I think they were
3 moderately different.
4 Q. When we met earlier, your earlier
5 deposition, you indicated or stated that Mr. Abbey
6 was involved in the restructuring. Do you recall
7 that?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Did you ever discuss restructure as such
10 with Mr. Abbey?
11 A. Sure I did.
12 Q. Was he --
13 A. Let me come back and explain the
14 relationship. George Abbey was the chief of staff.
15 He was here at 6 in the morning and left at 8 or 10
16 at night. His office was right next to my office,
17 and he and I talked freely all day long, in between
18 meetings.
19 Q. Is that the same position that General
20 Dailey occupies now?
21 A. I would say so, except both General Dailey
22 and I have learned to be more efficient and I am
0073
1 working less hours. General Dailey has a much
2 broader responsibility. General Dailey has a line
3 function now and George had a staff function. George
4 was an adviser and chief of staff, but General Dailey
5 is the associate deputy administrator for NASA. He
6 is responsible for all institutional activities at
7 NASA and up until about four weeks ago when the new
8 law went into effect he was the acting deputy
9 administrator of NASA so he has a different position
10 than George Abbey did, much more line
11 responsibility. He has line responsibility where
12 George had none.
13 Q. Was Mr. Abbey -- well, Mr. Abbey was
14 closely involved with you on all of this restructure?
15 A. Let me define closely involved.
16 Q. Please do.
17 A. He was an adviser to me, I relied on him.
18 I had not designed a craft that carried people. I
19 had designed rockets, I had designed space systems
20 but not anything that had people. I relied upon
21 George to help me understand that I relied upon
22 George's knowledge of people in selecting people. I
0074
1 relied upon George to bring information to me, and I
2 talked to him about a whole variety of subjects
3 constantly.
4 Q. What areas did he have expertise in that
5 was of particular significance to you in this
6 process?
7 A. Human space flight. George Abbey more than
8 anyone in the world understands what it takes to make
9 it safe for people to fly in space. He was there to
10 pick up the pieces after the people died on
11 Challenger. He knows each and every family. George
12 Abbey knows what there is to know to make sure
13 astronauts when they go into space have the maximum
14 chance of coming back alive. He has a corporate
15 knowledge of the organization. He worked on the
16 staff for George Lowe, who was the deputy
17 administrator of NASA during Apollo. He has been
18 with the astronauts since almost the beginning and he
19 has done nothing sort of a brilliant job, and I have
20 an incredible confidence in his judgment. And George
21 Abbey is a patriot. He puts the needs of the nation
22 and the lives of the astronauts before anything else.
0075
1 Q. So the vehicle was one thing, but human
2 space flight is another. Is that a fair statement?
3 A. They are interactive.
4 Q. And Abbey gave you that piece?
5 A. He filled that piece of, I am a damn good
6 designer and leader, but I didn't understand the
7 subtleties of human space flight and the emotion
8 involved and what it takes to make it safe for these
9 people, and who were the people who could be trusted
10 to do this.
11 When I got to this place, I will give you
12 another piece of information. The shuttle was taking
13 off, and we had conditions where that shuttle could
14 have blown up on the launch pad.
15 The contractors were making a tremendous
16 fee. Not one of them brought suggestions up, and
17 every time there was a problem they would add more
18 inspectors. And because of George Abbey, the shuttle
19 is three or four times more reliable and is spending
20 a billion dollars a year less on it. George Abbey
21 made that happen. And you know something, he pissed
22 off a lot of contractors.
0076
1 Q. Did you consult with General Dailey in
2 connection with restructure?
3 A. I talked to General Dailey, he was the
4 deputy administrator there, I don't have
5 recollections of specific conversations in this, but
6 during the process I talked to General Dailey about a
7 broad range of redesign subjects.
8 Q. I would like to bring your -- before I go
9 there, what was the relationship during restructure,
10 that would be the time period from March to let's say
11 October of '93, restructuring transition, between Mr.
12 Abbey and Mr. Dailey and you in connection with those
13 activities?
14 A. I don't remember the details of the
15 interaction, but I am sure we talked plenty about it.
16 Q. Did General Dailey have any technical
17 background that he brought to the table?
18 A. No. General Dailey was the deputy
19 Commandant of the U.S. Marines. And when I got to
20 NASA my primary concern was that the people here
21 needed to understand the concept of loyalty to the
22 President of the United States.
0077
1 When I got here there was a cabal going
2 on. The mid-level managers at NASA formed an iron
3 triangle which somebody wrote about in a book. It
4 was mid level mangers at NASA, the contractors and
5 staff direct force up in the Congress decided how
6 NASA was going to be run. And the President of the
7 United States said this is the way we are going, and
8 they would say oh no, this is the way we were going.
9 And I wanted someone to come to NASA who
10 understood the concept of loyalty to the President
11 and inculcate that into every single employee here.
12 So I went out and actively saw Jack Dailey and I
13 asked him to resign from the U. S. Marines to come
14 here. He understands people. He understands
15 loyalty, he understands management, and he is a
16 wonderful human being and I rely upon his judgment.
17 Q. So you knew him before he took this job?
18 A. No. I came here and I didn't know anyone.
19 I heard about him by reputation, I met with him for
20 an hour or two and hired him.
21 Q. Let's go to July 20, 1993, and I don't
22 expect you to recall anything specifically based on
0078
1 just --
2 A. But just to complete this, on a daily basis
3 I would communicate with Jack Dailey and seek his
4 advice. I rely upon Jack Dailey to run the NASA
5 institution if you will. I am the outside person, he
6 is the inside person.
7 Q. In terms of the leadership?
8 A. He manages the day-to-day activities of
9 this institution.
10 Q. And just for the people to keep the record
11 clean in talking about institution --
12 A. NASA.
13 Q. The agency itself and its facilities?
14 A. Yes. The institutional facilities.
15 Q. Do you recall on July 20, 1993, a briefing
16 that was to be given to the Freedom --
17 A. By the way, let me come back and say, again
18 the reason for my agitation --
19 Q. I didn't notice your agitation.
20 A. But maybe it is important you notice it.
21 When I got here everyone wanted to do their thing,
22 and people write memos and put things down on memos
0079
1 and it looks good, and then they put Signatures and a
2 date. But they don't ask what does the President of
3 the United States want. Then they go behind the
4 scenes to the Congress. They have secret clandestine
5 meetings with marketing reps and organizations that
6 do business with the government. So when someone
7 comes in here and says hey attention, I am in
8 charge. You bet there is going to be a lot of angry
9 people going around saying Goldin said, and what a
10 miserable guy he is, Goldin did this and that, and we
11 want to vote and this, and we are going to write
12 memos and we disagree with Goldin and by God we are
13 going to be in charge.
14 So I want to provide this context. This
15 doesn't go on at NASA anymore. And you will notice
16 NASA's budget has come down and this year we have 14
17 launches instead of two.
18 So when I speak with emotion I am presented
19 pieces of paper which are snapshots in time showing
20 dissent, showing the desires of corporations who are
21 interested in making profits and not putting the
22 national needs first. This is not, this is the
0080
1 contractors that work at NASA. And it is very
2 important that be understood in this context. And I
3 came in and I chose to come by myself, I didn't bring
4 one human being with me because I wanted the staff to
5 know here that I wanted to work with them.
6 It was a nightmare those first two years.
7 People attacked me, people called me a criminal. I
8 was sworn in and accused of almost criminal activity
9 and that is the context of what was going on here.
10 So I could not have the normal nice neat stuff where
11 I sit and give a directive who gives it to someone.
12 So there is a lot of noise in this system. And
13 people know with certainty what they heard me say. I
14 talked to thousands of people, and I can't recollect
15 everything. And it is important that be understood.
16 Q. Do you recall meeting with marketing reps?
17 You were talking about marketing reps. You
18 identified the marketing receipt. Did you meet with
19 marking reps from Rockwell?
20 A. Each company had a different way of
21 working. Some companies had their chief executive
22 officer come. For example, the Martin company,
0081
1 Norman Augustine walked into my office by himself
2 asked for a meeting on a continuing basis and wanted
3 to talk to me.
4 Jack Welsh of the G.E. Company came and
5 spoke to me. Some CEOs sent in marketing reps.
6 Others sent in lead executives.
7 Q. You would meet with marketing reps?
8 A. I occasionally did. I met with the
9 marketing rep from Grumman.
10 Q. That was sent, or sent for?
11 A. I don't remember. But there was a
12 marketing rep from Grumman, a terrific fellow I knew
13 when I was at TRW.
14 Q. Do you recall his name?
15 A. No. But it will come to me. I met with
16 him and in fact I ran into him at fairs, and he came
17 to see me a couple of times.
18 Q. Did you ever initiate these meetings?
19 A. I may have, I don't recollect. It is a
20 confusion. When I first came here I wanted it to be
21 open. Now I generally try and meet with the CEOs and
22 chairman of company, there are so few of them. We
0082
1 have a little bit more order. But I try to be open
2 and available to people.
3 Q. Let's go, do you recall a meeting that
4 occurred on July 20, 1993 at which the Freedom
5 contractors, the four contractors were going to be
6 briefed for the first time on the acquisition
7 strategy by Ms. McInerney of the SRT?
8 A. That was the 29th anniversary of landing on
9 the moon.
10 Q. Do you remember reviewing the charts that
11 were to be presented to the contractors by
12 Ms. McInerney or the SRT?
13 A. No. I don't recollect.
14 Q. Do you remember meeting with Colonel
15 O'Connor prior to that meeting about what was going
16 to be said to the contractors?
17 A. No, I don't recollect.
18 Q. Do you have any recollection of discussing
19 then or at any time the charts that would be
20 presented to the contractors, briefings that would be
21 given?
22 A. I don't recollect that.
0083
1 Q. Is there anything that might help you
2 recall that meeting that you can think of?
3 A. No.
4 MR. ESHELMAN: Let me show you a document
5 now that has been previously marked as Exhibit 54 and
6 see if that helps.
7 (Exhibit No. 54
8 marked for identification.)
9 MR. ESHELMAN: I also want to show you a
10 document previously marked as Exhibit 132, which I
11 only have one copy.
12 (Exhibit No. 132
13 marked for identification.)
14 THE WITNESS: This looks like a summary of
15 this (pointing).
16 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
17 Q. I would represent to you, Mr. Goldin, that
18 Exhibit 254 is a collection of charts from the
19 Exhibit 132.
20 A. 132 is dated 7 June and this is dated 20
21 July.
22 Q. That is correct.
0084
1 Ms. McInerney testified that she did a new
2 cover page whenever she gave the briefing, she had
3 number of briefs which she pulled together a
4 different briefing she was asked to do. She
5 characterized herself as the queen of briefings at
6 one point.
7 MR. BRILLIANT: Whatever Ms. McInerney's
8 testimony is are you directing a particular question
9 to him --
10 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
11 Q. I would like to direct your attention,
12 please on Exhibit 132 to Bates numbered page 628,
13 last three, about halfway down the document. In that
14 connection I would draw your attention to the
15 indication here that SSEIC would be phased out.
16 Do you see that chart?
17 A. I see it.
18 Q. Do you recall directing Colonel O'Connor to
19 pull this chart from Ms. McInerney's presentation?
20 A. No, I don't.
21 Q. Let me just by way of refreshing your
22 recollection, draw your attention to page 103 to 105
0085
1 of Colonel O'Connor's deposition where it is stated.
2 "Question, Do you recall Mr. Goldin
3 directing specific slides as being the only slides
4 Ms. McInerney would be allowed to brief at this
5 meeting by contractors?" Referring to the July 20,
6 1993.
7 "Answer, I have a vague recollection he
8 gave us guidance on what he could talk to various
9 people about, but specifically this particular
10 meeting, no.
11 Question, When you say he gave guidance,
12 you mean --
13 Answer, it is too early to say that to that
14 group. We would say We are going to go brief so and
15 so. He would say I see your briefing but I don't
16 think we are ready to tell those guys that subject
17 yet. Hold off on that, the rest of that is fine.
18 Question, And --
19 Answer, That certainly would have been done
20 for a contractor briefing.
21 Question, Would have?
22 Answer, Yes, and that is consistent with
0086
1 what we would do because of the sensitivity of the
2 procurement part of this. I am not surprised he
3 would even have given us guidance on how much of this
4 to brief to the contractors at this point.
5 Question, Is sensitivity at this point
6 would be what since the program is pretty much set in
7 concrete, wasn't it.
8 Answer, No, we had not picked a prime yet,
9 we had not selected a host center.
10 Question, This was immediately before the
11 CEO meeting?" And I am here referring to the July 22
12 meeting you had with the CEOs of the four Freedom
13 contractors.
14 "Answer, We had not even gotten the CEOs to
15 agree with what we were doing.
16 Question, By this time there had been a
17 decision taken to bring the CEOs in for agreement.
18 Answer, Yes."
19 Now, is Colonel O'Connor's recollection
20 that I have just given to you from his deposition
21 consistent with yours on this point?
22 MR. BRILLIANT: Objection. You read to the
0087
1 witness about a page and a half of deposition
2 testimony. You are asking him questions about that.
3 Before you ask questions, I think the witness should
4 have a chance because that is too much to remember,
5 to look at the transcript.
6 MR. ESHELMAN: Sure. How much time do you
7 want?
8 MR. BRILLIANT: Do you recall exactly where
9 you started?
10 MR. LITTLEJOHN: Page 103 to 105.
11 MR. ESHELMAN: Let's go off the record.
12 (Discussion off the record).
13 MR. ESHELMAN: Back on the record.
14 Just before we launch into this, I want to
15 say that I am trying to move this thing along because
16 I want to conserve your time. I have some questions
17 here though so I am going to try to press on through
18 them.
19 THE WITNESS: I will do the best I can.
20 MR. ESHELMAN: And to the extent we could
21 incorporate by references the comments you already
22 made, if you could refer to them --
0088
1 THE WITNESS: Got you, that will be my
2 pleasure.
3 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
4 Q. I read to you the portion from Colonel
5 O'Connor's deposition. And you wanted to read --
6 A. I read it.
7 Q. Now, my question to you was, does that
8 confirm or is it consistent with your recollection?
9 A. When I read it it is a bunch of vague
10 incomplete recollections that he had, so I can't
11 correlate what he said with anything.
12 Q. You did provide however guidance of this
13 sort. This fits within the ambit of the guidance you
14 provided?
15 A. To this document, I don't know that I
16 provided any guidance. I don't remember this
17 document is my problem.
18 Q. And you are referring to Exhibit 54?
19 A. Or 132. I don't remember those specific
20 documents. Did I talk to Bryan and give him guidance
21 on subjects? Sure. But words he has is incredibly
22 vague and relative to the circumstances, I don't know
0089
1 how --
2 Q. Was there any concern on your part in July
3 of '93 after the SRT completed its deliberations that
4 certain information was premature to be given to the
5 contractors?
6 A. I don't recollect that. And I can say that
7 sometimes there is incomplete data and I get
8 concerned when they dictate half baked data and
9 present it, then it becomes reality. And I want to
10 make sure they are complete in what they do.
11 Q. I do not want to revisit the CEO meeting
12 here. However, I do want to ask if you recall
13 whether you had any concern in July, around the 20th,
14 that the information that would be provided or
15 briefed to the contractors would impact what you were
16 trying to accomplish at that meeting on the 22nd?
17 A. No. I think things ought to be consistent,
18 but there are certain things you talk to CEOs about
19 and certain things you talk to lower level executives
20 about. Although I don't remember the details, I
21 think between the two meetings, all the information
22 that had to be transmitted was.
0090
1 Q. Referring to Exhibit 132, the page 628, the
2 last four of the Bates number, that is the thicker
3 package that is right in front of you there. Would
4 you have been concerned that the information on this
5 slide indicating that Grumman was going to be
6 terminated would have impacted what you were trying
7 to accomplish on the 22nd of July?
8 MR. BRILLIANT: I object to the form of the
9 question.
10 THE WITNESS: Are you inferring I would
11 want to hold this information back to get Grumman to
12 go ahead? I am trying to understand the thrust of
13 the question.
14 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
15 Q. I'm asking if that would have been a
16 concern of yours?
17 A. I am trying to understand the level of
18 concern. Is the inference that I was trying to hold
19 back data from Grumman so they could make a
20 decision? If that is the case, absolutely not.
21 Q. That would be perhaps one response to it.
22 A concern is something different. Would you have
0091
1 been concerned?
2 A. In what way?
3 Q. That it would have affected your ability to
4 accomplish your goal for the good of the American
5 people and the President?
6 A. Living within the laws of the land?
7 Q. Right.
8 A. Would this chart?
9 MR. BRILLIANT: The question is vague.
10 THE WITNESS: I think I stated at that
11 meeting what I thought the objective was. And I
12 don't understand the context of the question asking
13 to this chart to the statements I made. I tried to
14 clarify it, and if the implication was that this
15 chart was being maliciously held back so that Grumman
16 would go ahead with a decision, I would say
17 absolutely not. There would be no desire on my part
18 to hold this chart back.
19 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
20 Q. I am implying nothing.
21 A. But I was trying to characterize what you
22 were saying. It is important to me in answering your
0092
1 question.
2 Q. Do you know -- I am trying to stick to
3 facts not characterizations.
4 Do you recall why the chart, any reason why
5 it would not have been presented?
6 A. I don't remember seeing the package.
7 I see that there were, from what I see here
8 there may be about five or six charts, and they look
9 like to be about 50 charts here.
10 Q. Talking about the distinction between 54
11 and 132?
12 A. 54 and 132, yes. Some charts were taken
13 out. It looks like 95 percent of the charts were
14 taken out.
15 Q. You testified this was a fairly open
16 process, correct?
17 A. I believe it was above board.
18 Q. It was open?
19 A. Open in what sense?
20 Q. In the sense that you are a process driven
21 agency, I think you testified previously, correct?
22 A. I am trying to understand what you mean.
0093
1 Open to the press, open to the public, open in what
2 sense?
3 Q. Open to the contractors, the SRT process.
4 It was a free exchange of information?
5 A. I would hope there was. I was not there
6 all the time, but I would expect there was.
7 Q. Is there any reason that you can think of
8 now, putting yourself back at that time, why these
9 charts would not have been presented to the
10 contractors?
11 A. No, other than that there was a 95 percent
12 reduction in charts just from the rough look, and
13 some charts were presented and some were not. I
14 don't know. I don't know that I reviewed every
15 single chart in this package. I don't know whether
16 it was presented or not presented. I just don't
17 know.
18 But coming back in terms of open, I would
19 hope that everything we do at NASA is open in the
20 sense that we have the funds.
21 Q. Now, you previously identified a Boeing
22 marketing person I believe is how you characterized
0094
1 him, marketing rep, David Knowlen, do you recall him?
2 A. Yes. I am not sure he was marketing. He
3 had a different job. I said marketing, but I am not
4 sure. It was a Boeing representative of some sort.
5 Q. How did you come to know him?
6 A. I don't know. I assume -- I took trips
7 with a number of different contractors and I got to
8 meet a lot of people. I might have met him on the
9 first trip I made to Boeing.
10 Q. Do you recall calling him in 1983?
11 A. No. I remember talking to him, I don't
12 remember if I called him, but I could have.
13 Q. Do you remember talking to him on the
14 telephone with Mr. Abbey?
15 A. No. I don't remember a specific
16 conversation. But I do remember talking to him on
17 numerous occasions.
18 Q. Do you remember Mr. Abbey talking to him?
19 A. I know Mr. Abbey talked to him. I don't
20 know the occasions.
21 Q. Do you recall how frequently?
22 A. No.
0095
1 Q. Do you recall how frequently you spoke with
2 him?
3 A. I don't think it was daily, I am not sure
4 it was even weekly.
5 Q. Do you still talk to him?
6 A. I call him because he almost died, and I
7 speak with him from time to time to see how he is
8 doing.
9 Q. Did you ever give his telephone number, or
10 suggest that Congressman Brooks call him, Jack
11 Brooks?
12 A. I don't remember that.
13 Q. Or Governor Richards?
14 A. I don't remember that.
15 Q. Ann Richards of Texas.
16 A. I know who she is. Again in the context of
17 my job?
18 Q. In the time frame '93.
19 A. In the time frame of 1993 I probably
20 communicated with about five or ten governors and a
21 couple hundred members of Congress, and hundreds of
22 corporate executives, university people, and I am
0096
1 sure there was a sharing of information.
2 Q. Do you remember giving Mr. Knowlen's
3 telephone number to either of those individuals?
4 A. I don't remember, no.
5 Q. Do you know who Congressman Brooks is?
6 A. Oh, yes.
7 Q. Do you recall what position or what
8 Mr. Knowlen had to do with the aerospace industry?
9 A. I think he had some leadership positions in
10 a number of aerospace organizations.
11 Q. Meaning other than Boeing?
12 A. Professional organizations?
13 Q. Like Aerospace Industries, AIA?
14 A. Boeing -- AIA is different, it's corporate
15 membership. I think he was in a professional
16 organization, and I can't recollect which one.
17 MR. ESHELMAN: I want to show you a
18 document that has been previously marked as Exhibit
19 98.
20 (Exhibit No. 98
21 Marked for identification.)
22 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
0097
1 Q. Did you review this document in preparation
2 for your deposition here today?
3 A. I read it this morning.
4 Q. Any other documents you read?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. What were they?
7 A. I was given the five documents, a number of
8 conversations, three were conversations with Boeing,
9 and two were conversations with Renso Caporali.
10 Q. And this includes this Exhibit 98?
11 A. Yes, I read it about 12:45 today.
12 Q. Anything else?
13 A. Pardon me?
14 Q. Any other document?
15 A. That is it.
16 Q. Did you talk with anyone other than your
17 attorneys today about the deposition?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Did you review any documents your attorney
20 did not give you?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Anything else other than your attorneys
0098
1 gave you?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Did Mr. Abbey give you any --
4 A. No, I have not talked to Ms. Abbey about
5 this period.
6 Q. Or Ms. Garmin?
7 A. No, no discussions with them.
8 Q. Let's go to Exhibit 98 --
9 A. I have been on vacation, and I was not
10 going to interfere with my vacation. I just got
11 back.
12 Q. Do you recall telling Mr. Knowlen that it
13 was all right with you if he took notes of your
14 conversations with him?
15 A. No. I don't ever recall having him ask me
16 that.
17 Q. I would like to refer you now to the fourth
18 paragraph in this Exhibit 98, where Mr. Knowlen
19 reports that you would like to, quote, take the
20 Boeing modules "and wrap a whole new Space Station
21 around them." That is the fourth paragraph down.
22 A. I don't recollect saying it, but at the
0099
1 time, unfortunately since that time we found the
2 Boeing modules were not any damn good either. At the
3 time that looked like the only good hardware on the
4 station. They had not built any hardware yet, but we
5 sadly found out after the fact that even the modules
6 were in bad shape. This was the one remnant piece of
7 hardware that looked like it was in good shape.
8 Q. This is December 12, 1992 we are talking
9 about?
10 A. There was a power system at that time
11 looked like it was in deep trouble, and the equipment
12 that Mac-Dac was building, the trusses were in
13 trouble. It looks like at the time the only thing
14 working was the modules. And subsequent to that
15 point in time after we awarded the prime we found out
16 even the modules were in trouble.
17 The problem I am having here is these are
18 Dave Knowlen's writings. I don't know the context of
19 what I said. These are little bullets here. But the
20 context that I would like to provide of my
21 recollection at the time, not what Dave Knowlen said,
22 my recollection at the time was the only hardware
0100
1 that looked like it was in decent shape were the
2 pressurized modules Boeing was building, and at that
3 time I had been through that disastrous exercise of
4 trying to redesign the Space Station without
5 presidential approval, and failed. And I was
6 frustrated because I saw the program in deep trouble
7 and I was directed to continue building the Space
8 Station Freedom, and I had talked to loads of people
9 trying to figure out what to do. Because the Space
10 Station was still in trouble, and as I told you, I
11 was openly exposed with people trying to figure out
12 what to do.
13 Q. So this statement would be accurate of your
14 sentiment at this time, December 12?
15 A. With the context I provided that on the
16 hardware that looked like it was working was the
17 modules, but we subsequently found out those modules
18 didn't work.
19 Q. You recall the Wright Memorial dinner of
20 that year where this conversation is reported to have
21 occurred?
22 A. No. I attended the Wright Memorial dinner
0101
1 a number of times.
2 Q. Do you recall reporting that Senators
3 Dominici and Nunn had come out against the Space
4 Station program to Mr. Knowlen?
5 A. I don't think that that was deep dark
6 news. I think it was well known in Washington and
7 they certainly did come out against the Space
8 Station. I had met with them, I think Nunn came out
9 against it and maybe Dominici may have supported it.
10 But at the time, I think this was not deep dark
11 secrets.
12 Q. Well, McDonnell-Douglas's financial status
13 he reports that you discussed with him here. Do you
14 recall discussing that with him?
15 A. I don't know I discussed with him, but it
16 was something I discussed with a number of people. I
17 was generally concerned about things I had been
18 hearing.
19 Q. About insolvency?
20 A. Insolvency of McDonnell-Douglas. I was
21 worried about it, because they were a major
22 contractor on the station.
0102
1 Q. And which part of the station were they
2 building?
3 A. Hard to say. They were building the
4 trusses of bits and pieces everywhere.
5 Q. And was there some institutional concern or
6 concern that you or Mr. Abbey had that that slack
7 would have to be picked up somewhere?
8 A. Here is Dan Goldin, you ask Abbey. I was
9 concerned if McDonnell-Douglas went under we would
10 not have a Space Station because they had a lot of
11 hardware to be designed. They had all the design
12 tools. And I was terribly concerned that I was
13 watching this thing fall in on itself.
14 Q. Did you in fact suggest to him that Boeing
15 consider taking over the program?
16 A. I don't remember the conversation, but it
17 was certainly something in my mind as a possibility
18 that it was one of multiple possibilities.
19 Q. Or buying out McDonnell-Douglas?
20 A. Yes. And by the way, I have conversations
21 like this all the time. I just had one yesterday
22 with a contractor. And all these conversations I
0103
1 start by saying, whatever you do, do it within the
2 law.
3 Q. He reports here that you made a comment to
4 the fact you could not understand why Boeing didn't
5 take a bigger role in the program. Do you recall
6 that comment?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Was there any question or did you have any
9 clear idea then or now how a company could take a
10 bigger role on a program that had been competitively
11 awarded?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. How?
14 A. Boeing bought McDonnell-Douglas. Boeing
15 bought Rocketdyne.
16 Q. Do you recall Mr. Abbey saying --
17 A. And by the way, that is something a
18 decision that they make themselves.
19 Q. Do you recall Mr. Abbey saying at that
20 dinner or in your presence that he had more
21 information that he would give to Mr. Knowlen later?
22 A. No.
0104
1 Q. Or that he would go to Boeing to discuss
2 the matter with Mr. Knowlen?
3 A. No.
4 Q. Or do you recall requesting Boeing --
5 A. My problem is I don't remember the
6 discussion. So as you go into detail, I don't
7 remember the details. I can only say in the context
8 at the time I was afraid that Mac-Dac was going to go
9 under. And by the way this is December of '92 and
10 the signals were coming up from Capitol Hill loud and
11 clear that the Space Station was going to be voted
12 down. And the results were in that spring we were,
13 we won by one vote. It was very, very difficult.
14 Q. Was that the FY-93 budget?
15 A. '94.
16 Q. One vote.
17 A. No, the vote occurred in '93, it was the
18 '94 budget. And the signals were coming out, the
19 election of '92 was over. We started polling members
20 of Congress, and I saw this thing falling apart and I
21 was not seeing anybody doing anything. And I was
22 terribly concerned about the program feeling that I
0105
1 had no control. I felt I came in as NASA
2 administrator and if I asked my people to look how
3 you could redesign it to save money that they would
4 do what I asked. When I asked them to redesign it
5 they immediately went up to Congress and they
6 undermined me and I was told to stop redesigning it.
7 Q. Do you recall ever, or do you ever recall
8 receiving a proposal from Boeing to be the
9 integration contractor on the Space Station program?
10 A. No.
11 MR. ESHELMAN: I want to show you a
12 document previously marked as Exhibit 126.
13 (Exhibit No. 126
14 marked for identification.)
15 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
16 Q. Was this one of the documents you reviewed
17 this morning?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Do you recall speaking with Mr. Knowlen
20 around the 6th of April 1993 about the subject of
21 Boeing becoming, presenting a proposal to NASA that
22 would be structured with new management team, as he
0106
1 says in paragraph 1, of Boeing, Rockwell, Lockheed
2 and a smaller role for Grumman that might include
3 Martin Marietta?
4 A. No. Again, I could tell you in the context
5 I had tremendous concern that it was only getting
6 worse at this time. We were in the middle of the
7 redesign. The hearings on the Hill were incredibly
8 intense. The contractors, I don't know who were
9 lobbying to hold on to the space station Freedom.
10 The President's team was absolutely committed to the
11 redesign.
12 People felt all they had to do was operate
13 the way they were operating in for the past eight or
14 ten years and everything would be okay. And I was
15 openly exploring options with a number of different
16 organizations to see what in the world could be done.
17 Q. Do you recall making similar suggestions to
18 any of the other contractors?
19 MR. BRILLIANT: Similar to what?
20 MR. ESHELMAN: To the one in paragraph 1 of
21 this memorandum.
22 THE WITNESS: I think I might have. I
0107
1 certainly talked to a lot of people about it.
2 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
3 Q. About those people taking over the program?
4 A. Someone taking over the program,
5 absolutely, seeing if anyone was interested in doing
6 it.
7 Q. Mr. Knowlen reports a fair amount of detail
8 here including Lockheed and a small role for
9 Grumman. Do you know why Lockheed was included?
10 A. The Martin company was a subcontractor to a
11 number of Space Station primes. Martin had competed
12 for some of the level 1 contracts and lost, but they
13 were subcontracted on a number of them. And they had
14 some critical roles to play. And how he wrote these
15 words, I don't know.
16 Q. Now I would like to move on to the second
17 paragraph we have here. Before I do that, in your
18 mind were your conversations with Mr. Knowlen
19 consistent with the work the SRT was doing at this
20 time? This was right in the middle of the SRT.
21 A. I don't remember the conversation so I
22 don't recall the details. But they were broad issues
0108
1 that I would discuss, and they were things that were
2 inappropriate to discuss that were some of these
3 sensitive subjects so I did not do it.
4 And the broad concerns I had were at the
5 time, and I think this bears them out, I was
6 concerned that people thought they could keep Space
7 Station Freedom, and I knew that Space Station
8 Freedom was dead, and if the Congress wanted Space
9 Station Freedom, the administration would just cancel
10 the program.
11 That was the principal concern.
12 Contractors were lobbying for different approaches,
13 some even made up their own approaches not included
14 in the last study. There was a lot of information
15 out there. I was concerned we didn't have clear
16 lines of authority, that it needed strong systems
17 management, and I was trying to explore ideas openly
18 to find ways around the problem.
19 Q. Do you have any recollection of suggesting
20 a small role for Grumman?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Is it likely you suggested this information
0109
1 in the second paragraph that Mr. Knowlen reports
2 about the consideration the White House has given to
3 the inclusion of the Russians and the program?
4 A. That was open knowledge.
5 Q. When did it become open, do you recall?
6 A. I think the Russians came in March when
7 people knew the Russians had come to talk to me.
8 Q. Mr. Koptev?
9 A. Yes. My calendar was public. People knew
10 the Russians came to see me, and there was talk all
11 over the place that this was happening. People on
12 the Hill, some were excited and some people were
13 upset about it.
14 Q. I want to show you a document previously
15 marked as Exhibit 99.
16 A. And by the way, I think Koptev came to see
17 me before the summit before Clinton had with Yeltsin.
18 Q. With President Clinton or Bush?
19 A. Clinton had a summit with Yelsin in
20 February or March, sometime in that late winter early
21 spring.
22 MR. ESHELMAN: I show you a document
0110
1 previously marked as Exhibit 99.
2 (Exhibit No. 99
3 Marked for identification.)
4 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
5 Q. Is this one of the documents that you
6 reviewed?
7 A. There were three documents.
8 Q. Is this the third one?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. This is dated --
11 A. And by the way, I reviewed it in about
12 three minutes, maybe two.
13 Q. This is dated May 13, 1993, after the
14 previous one which was April. But still within the
15 term of the SRT?
16 A. Uh-huh. I am saying uh-huh, I don't
17 recollect the exact dates of the SRT, so I don't
18 think I should say uh-huh.
19 Q. March to June I will represent.
20 Do you recall approval that was reported
21 here in the second paragraph for a private meeting
22 between Boeing and Mr. Abbey?
0111
1 A. I think this is puffery on Mr. Knowlen.
2 Dave was tooting his horn as to how he would talk to
3 George Abbey, and I think he was blowing up his own
4 self importance. Dave has a tendency to do things
5 like that.
6 Q. At this time, May 13, 1993, you are
7 reported by Mr. Knowlen as stating that the White
8 House is not committed to the space program. Is that
9 consistent with your recollection?
10 A. I think at this time the White house was
11 committed to the space program. But uncertain about
12 the Space Station. I think Dave Knowlen had garbled
13 at least from what my perception was. I don't know
14 how he writes these things. I can tell you that the
15 administration is really supportive of the Space
16 Station in the broader sense, but had very
17 significant concerns about the Space Station, and
18 that they wanted to see the process work its way
19 out.
20 And when I say the White House, probably a
21 few hundred people over there that has a spectrum of
22 opinions. But it is not the space program. Again, I
0112
1 don't know about they, but that is the context of
2 this time frame.
3 Q. Mr. Knowlen reports as a direct quotation,
4 he said he made notes --
5 A. He certainly when he met with me didn't
6 have a note pad out. And let me repeat that. He did
7 not have a note pad out. He never told me that he
8 was taking notes to write them down. So I don't know
9 about the accuracy of what he writes.
10 Q. This is a report of a meeting or telephone
11 conversation, but they both occurred, meetings and
12 telephone conversations, correct?
13 A. I remember having meetings with him. I am
14 not so sure about telephone conversations. They
15 could have, I don't recollect them. But I recollect
16 meeting with him, he would run into me at meetings,
17 he may have planned at being at those meetings or
18 hearings that I was going to be, but we would talk.
19 Q. But he was there?
20 A. He was there, and then he would ask to see
21 me in my office and I would meet with him at my
22 office. I don't have a recollection of phone
0113
1 conversations but there could have been.
2 Q. In any event, is it consistent with your
3 recollection that certain people have promoted Boeing
4 as the prime in Congress, is that consistent with
5 your recollection?
6 A. The fact that Boeing is promoting, being
7 promoted in the Congress is not really of interest to
8 me now or was not then. The issue is what is the
9 right thing to do. And because Congress would want
10 Boeing would not be an influence to me, I don't
11 understand that. Again David may have been tooting
12 his horn.
13 Q. If you look at the fourth paragraph, the
14 part that is italicized, the parenthetical, where he
15 states that you, sort of the last phrase here, "He
16 sees Boeing as the prime contractor responsible for
17 system engineering because we are best at this." Is
18 that consistent?
19 A. I will say this, let me tell you, forget
20 about his words and I'll make social comments on his
21 words in a moment.
22 At the time I thought Boeing was an
0114
1 outstanding contractor. At the time I thought
2 Rockwell was an outstanding contractor. At the time
3 I thought Grumman had really good people. I didn't
4 have a tremendous amount of experience in this area,
5 but it was a good contractor, but not as strong as
6 the others, and I felt that McDonnell-Douglas was a
7 disaster waiting to happen. That was my sense of
8 where it was at the time.
9 Q. You in fact communicated that to
10 McDonnell-Douglas, didn't you?
11 A. Oh, yes, we had some pretty heavy duty
12 conversations. Again, as I tell you, I am open like
13 a book.
14 Q. Do you recall evaluating Option B as Mr.
15 Knowlen refers to it?
16 A. Hell no. I don't even know what Option B
17 is. You know, David, first of all, as I see this,
18 David is a great guy, I like him. But when people
19 are going to take minutes or notes they ought to tell
20 me. And then secondly I see things in here he says
21 that are at odds with what my thoughts were at the
22 time.
0115
1 Q. Is it your recollection that he never asked
2 if he could take notes?
3 A. No. But he didn't take notes with me, so
4 he would have to go out after a few hours and
5 recollect what was said and write it down as though
6 he was taking notes.
7 Q. Do you ever recall suggesting that Chris
8 Hanson of Boeing work closely with Jeff Lawrence of
9 NASA?
10 A. Yes. As I did with the senior Washington
11 reps for all the companies. I believe Grumman worked
12 with Jeff Lawrence. That is my recollection.
13 Q. Do you recall who that was?
14 A. I don't have it. But there was a Mac-Dac
15 rep, a short guy with curly hair. The Rockwell rep
16 was Clay -- he is now an executive in the Rockwell
17 corporation. But he did the marketing activities
18 here. I suggested all the Washington area people
19 work with Jeff Lawrence. I didn't want to get into
20 discussions with those people because Jeff was trying
21 to count votes on the Hill.
22 Q. He was your legislative --
0116
1 A. Yes, so what I wanted was these guys to
2 work with Lawrence to count votes. They would have
3 meetings and go and count votes.
4 Q. He reports you made several references to a
5 very important meeting next week that you could not
6 discuss the agenda of. Do you recall what meeting he
7 is referring to?
8 A. No. But when people wanted to probe me for
9 information, I could not talk about it, I said I
10 ain't telling you because it is sensitive.
11 Q. Do you recall stating to him at this time,
12 May of 1993, that Freedom is dead, dead, dead?
13 A. I don't recall telling him that. I told
14 the world. I gave speeches. I talked about it to
15 members of Congress who didn't like hearing it. I
16 went off to conferences. This is no deep dark
17 secret.
18 Q. That is the design of Freedom as opposed to
19 the lines of accountability of Freedom?
20 A. No. The Space Station Freedom program was
21 not going to proceed forward, that the redesign was
22 going proceed, that the redesign was going to proceed
0117
1 further. Some of the contractors had renegade
2 organizations who said they disagreed with the
3 President of the United States. The message was, I
4 was going to support the President of the United
5 States to the hilt, and he told me that the Space
6 Station Freedom was dead. And that is what I
7 transmitted to everybody.
8 Again, Dave Knowlen may have wanted to make
9 points with his bosses that he had all this great
10 information and has a pipeline to Goldin. I openly
11 discussed these things.
12 Q. Do you recall suggesting that Boeing take
13 an aggressive role in posturing itself in the
14 quote/unquote right direction for option C or some
15 other option?
16 A. I think David -- I don't remember telling
17 him that, and I don't know.
18 Q. Do you remember discussing with him what
19 you thought would be sellable to Congress?
20 A. I don't remember talking to him
21 specifically in the context of this memo. But I told
22 all the contractors what was unacceptable was Space
0118
1 Station Freedom, it didn't work. They spent $8
2 billion and spent eight years.
3 Q. Did you ever promise anyone a contract in
4 the Space Station program?
5 A. Promise them a contract?
6 Q. Right.
7 A. I don't remember ever doing that. Outside
8 of legal ethical guidelines, I don't recollect that
9 at all
10 MR. ESHELMAN: I would ask the reporter to
11 mark this as Exhibit 251.
12 (Exhibit No. 251
13 marked for identification.)
14 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
15 Q. I now show you Exhibit 251 and ask you,
16 have you seen this recently?
17 A. No.
18 Q. Would you take a moment to review this and
19 we will go off the record until you are through.
20 (Discussion off the record).
21 MR. ESHELMAN: Back on the record.
22 THE WITNESS: Wait a minute, I gave you bad
0119
1 information before. I said it was the Martin company
2 had subcontracts on this space station. Lockheed
3 also had subcontracts on the Space Station. And they
4 had not yet merged. That was the issue. I just
5 wanted to correct that.
6 MR. ESHELMAN: I think I made that
7 connection in the my mind before the question.
8 THE WITNESS: But I wanted to be
9 technically correct.
10 (Discussion off the record).
11 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
12 Q. Do you recall receiving this letter?
13 A. I don't recall receiving this letter, per
14 se, but I do remember that Lockheed was in a
15 different category. They were not one of the prime
16 contractors, and that they wanted to be included. I
17 do remember that. So I remember the context of this
18 letter.
19 Q. Do you recall responding to this letter?
20 A. No.
21 MR. ESHELMAN: Let me show you a document I
22 will now ask the reporter to mark as Exhibit 252.
0120
1 (Exhibit No. 252
2 marked for identification.)
3 THE WITNESS: What I wanted to say, I wish
4 I got all the credit that was given to me in terms of
5 my influence and direction. The Vest panel made very
6 specific recommendations independently. They were
7 set there to help us make sure that the process had
8 integrity to it, and they were some of the best
9 people in the country. And they made some
10 recommendations about how we ought to go also.
11 Q. Who directed the Vest panel?
12 A. I think they reported to Dr. Gibbons.
13 Q. At the Office of Science and Technology
14 policy?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. The White House?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Did you select the members?
19 A. Chuck Vest was responsible.
20 Q. He was not the first person though charged
21 with that responsibility, though, was he?
22 A. Was there someone else?
0121
1 Q. Before him, wasn't there?
2 A. Before Chuck Vest? Help me. I thought
3 Chuck Vest was in charge.
4 Q. I am advised I am confused. The SRT was
5 Joe Shea, preceded by O'Connor?
6 A. Yes, he had a very major stroke. And Bryan
7 was kind enough to step up. Joe is the guy who
8 designed Apollo, Dr. Shea.
9 Q. I show you now Exhibit 252 and direct your
10 attention to the third paragraph on page Bates number
11 483 the first two sentences there, "NASA fully
12 understands and appreciates Lockheed's involvement in
13 and importance to the overall Space Station program.
14 That role will continue under whatever prime
15 subcontractor arrangement emerges from the current
16 effort." Do you see that? Did you write that?
17 A. I signed
it. I very rarely write letters.
18 I see it. I don't know it actually remained that
19 way. I don't think the wording is good, but I
20 certainly signed it. I can tell you I signed it. I
21 very rarely write these letters. It is prepared by
22 the staff, they bring it in and ask me to sign it.
0122
1 Q. At this point in time on what basis could
2 Lockheed be guaranteed participation?
3 A. I think it is an unfortunate choice of
4 words. Looking at it now on January 6, 1999 I don't
5 know how they could. But I signed it. We have a lot
6 of pieces of paper. Some of which are correct and
7 some of which are inappropriate. But I signed it.
8 Q. Is Lockheed still part of the program?
9 A. Yes, they are.
10 Q. Are they involved -- what are they involved
11 in?
12 A. I think they build -- they had a very
13 specific set of hardware. They build solar cells,
14 solar rays.
15 Q. Do they do a lot of life sciences?
16 A. They build the slip rings for the gimbel.
17 Q. As subcontractors to Boeing?
18 A. Now they are, I think they were a
19 subcontractor to McDonnell-Douglas. Or no,
20 subcontractor to Rockwell, which was also acquired by
21 Boeing. But they were building a lot of the very
22 critical hardware.
0123
1 Q. You have alluded directly pressure that was
2 flowing from Congress on you directly, and
3 programmatic pressures that Congress was putting on
4 the agency. Was there in your mind an outstanding
5 member or staffer who was applying the most pressure?
6 A. Oh, there was a chorus. When I got sent up
7 by the White House --
8 Q. For confirmation?
9 A. No, to announce the redesign. No, I was
10 fine in confirmation, I was unanimously confirmed.
11 It was a great relationship until I went up and
12 announced, A) we are redesigning the Space Station
13 and considering bringing in the Russians. You could
14 have froze faces on all the 20 or 30 members of the
15 House Science Committee.
16 Q. Any one particular member or certain
17 members putting more pressure than others?
18 A. It was bipartisan. George Brown was very
19 unhappy with me, he was the chairman, the ranking was
20 Bob Walker, he was angry. And I could go down the
21 hierarchy, they were furious with me. It was one of
22 the interesting moments of my life. But I felt I was
0124
1 here to do the right thing and I worked with them,
2 never lost my temper, and we made it through.
3 Q. Did you put Mr. Mallow in that category?
4 A. Mallow is not a member of Congress.
5 Q. I meant or staffer.
6 A. Oh, Dick Mallow was furious. It was
7 universal.
8 Q. Dr. Oberman?
9 A. Oh, yes. Democrats and Republicans, they
10 were universally upset because change is very
11 difficult in Washington, very difficult. And to
12 their credit they had supported the program. And
13 after all the support for the program they said now
14 eight years later you are coming back and redesigning
15 it. They were upset.
16 Q. Who was that that said that?
17 A. Oh, I got it from almost every quarter.
18 Q. Have you ever heard Mr. Mallow referred to
19 as King Mallow?
20 A. I didn't think he was King Mallow. When I
21 took the job --
22 Q. Have you ever referred to him as King
0125
1 Mallow?
2 A. No, but let me tell you how I referred to
3 him. I was given advice by the White House when I
4 took this job that kings talk to kings and princes
5 talk to princes. I was to talk to the members and
6 staffers, to talk to staffers. My predecessors used
7 to talk to staffers. I felt I should not talk to
8 staff, and I didn't refer to him as King Mallow.
9 Q. But you heard him referred to as King
10 Mallow?
11 A. No, I heard him referred to in other
12 glorious terms.
13 Q. Similar?
14 A. Not so generous.
15 Q. Was there ever a time when there was
16 pressure to give in to a particular member or
17 staffer's wishes as opposed to others?
18 A. For me?
19 Q. For the agency.
20 A. For me, as the NASA administrator, I report
21 to the President of the United States. My loyalty is
22 to the President of the United States. And I support
0126
1 the President and I think if you take a look at my
2 record, I treat the members with dignity they
3 deserve, but I represent the President of the United
4 States come hell or high water, and I try to do the
5 right thing. I try to listen. If there is a
6 rational reason I will then go back to the White
7 House and talk to them. But I think I have
8 demonstrated, in fact during my confirmation hearing
9 then Senator Gore, who was in charge of my hearing,
10 says I think this fellow has a steel beam in his back
11 and could withstand the pressures of this Congress.
12 Q. Was there no compromise whatsoever in favor
13 of a particular viewpoint the Congress might be --
14 A. No, Congress must review what the president
15 recommends. But I was reacting to your statement of
16 submitting to Congressional pressure. And this
17 agency had 20 years of not submitting to
18 Congressional pressure. This agency had 20 years of
19 being directed by staff.
20 Q. You testified that you had, I think it was
21 Jeff Lawrence counting votes among other things, but
22 he and Chris Hanson at least and some of the other
0127
1 representatives?
2 A. No. And the representatives from Rockwell
3 and Grumman and Boeing and Lockheed, they exchanged
4 information. They didn't do anything improper. But
5 if they went to talk to members on the Hill they
6 would exchange information.
7 Q. And that information was for some members
8 information more important than others when it came
9 to what would and would not work when the President's
10 package went up?
11 A. Well, if
it was the Speaker of the House, I
12 would say it was pretty darn important. Or the head
13 of the Appropriations Committee, I would say that's
14 important. If it was the head of the authorizing
15 committee, I would say they have more sway than
16 others.
17 Q. But George Brown was head of the Science
18 Committee and he would be a heavy hitter in this
19 process?
20 A. One of a number. But let me come back and
21 say, it is my job to advocate to the President's
22 position, to listen to the concerns of Congress, and
0128
1 if they have legitimate concerns to try and see if we
2 can accommodate them. But not to submit to just pure
3 brutal pressure, but to try to work with them.
4 Q. I am only interested in what happened.
5 A. If you ask me a specific question I will
6 give you a specific answer.
7 Q. Specifically, George Brown is important to
8 the process, his information would be influential?
9 A. I would say that George Brown is one of the
10 most experienced members in Congress who understands
11 the space program exceptionally well. I highly
12 respect his opinions and when he speaks I listen
13 because I respect him.
14 Q. And what about Congressman Brooks?
15 A. When he talked I listened to him, he is a
16 very wise man.
17 Q. Mr. DeLay?
18 A. Mr. DeLay is another very strong very wise
19 man whose guidance I constantly seek and I find him
20 to be incredibly reasonable on Space issues.
21 Q. Mr. Stokes?
22 A. Mr. Stokes is another one of these people.
0129
1 Q. As far as staffers are concerned, where
2 would, in this universe, Dr. Oberman fit?
3 A. I had almost my entire conversations with
4 members. It was a distinct, when I took over as
5 administrator, I decided to spend my time with
6 members. And I would have the Space Station team go
7 up and brief staff, and it is not that I wanted to be
8 disrespectful to staff. But I did not spend my time
9 talking to staff.
10 Q. We only have so much time here and I'm
11 trying to conserve it here.
12 But obviously certain staff members, their
13 information would be more valuable as to which
14 direction a given member or committee was moving.
15 Would Dr. Oberman have been one such staff member?
16 A. I didn't concern myself with staff.
17 Q. Information from staff was completely
18 irrelevant?
19 A. It was not irrelevant. Let me put it this
20 way, the staff had their opinions, and I found my
21 people would come to me and say Boy the staff feels
22 this way. I would go talk to the member and I would
0130
1 get something 180 degrees different than what the
2 staff felt.
3 And that is why I felt I have one on one
4 meetings with about 200 people on the Hill
5 specifically for this reason. Because what they say
6 is important. I don't want to demean the staff
7 position, but I made a very conscious decision that I
8 would talk to members. In fact there was a lot of
9 stress between Dick Mallow and myself, who I respect,
10 I knew Dick Mallow before I came here. I didn't go
11 visit him. I visited his chairman, Mr. Traxler. I
12 invited him to my office once, maybe twice, that is
13 it.
14 So I literally changed the way NASA was
15 doing business. When I tell you about staff I tried
16 to really distance myself from staff. Not to be
17 abusive or disrespectful, but I felt it was important
18 for the administrator to talk directly to the members
19 who vote.
20 Q. In that context, in the calculus that you
21 were using at time to develop a position on behalf of
22 the President to implement the President's program,
0131
1 did you find particular staff members to be more
2 influential on the members than others?
3 A. Some hated me more than others. Some of
4 them tried to get me removed as administrator, some
5 of them threatened me because I didn't listen to
6 which direction they were giving my staff.
7 Q. Yes, but with regard to, did you find
8 certain staff members' position generally tracked the
9 members and were more meritorious in terms of --
10 A. Let me come back and tell you, I did not
11 spend my time worrying about what the staff thought
12 because I dealt directly with the members.
13 Q. And your staff worked with the staff?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And how was that --
16 A. And by the way, traditionally, the
17 contractors didn't understand that because the
18 contractors for about ten or 20 years had a lock on
19 the NASA budget, because they would have back scene
20 meetings with the staff and the mid-level NASA
21 managers, and they would decide the budget that would
22 be given to the NASA administrator.
0132
1 And I decided that was no longer going to
2 happen at NASA. And I wanted to make sure that the
3 members understood that I was going to run this
4 agency and I wanted to work directly with them
5 without disrespect to the staff, that we would work
6 with the staff. Now, sometimes staff would meet with
7 the members and me and my staff.
8 Q. They would meet with you?
9 A. They would meet with the member, when I
10 would meet one on one with the member, the staff
11 would be in the room.
12 Q. Was there ever such a meeting where you met
13 with Mr. Mallow with a member?
14 A. Yes, Mr. Traxler was there. In fact the
15 first time I met Mr. Mallow, not only was Mr. Traxler
16 there, but Jeff Lawrence was there with Mr. Green.
17 MR. ESHELMAN: Let me show you a document
18 previously marked as Exhibit 105.
19 (Exhibit No. 105
20 marked for identification.)
21 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
22 Q. Let me ask you if you have seen these
0133
1 minutes or notes before?
2 A. No. I don't recollect ever seeing this.
3 Q. I would like you to go down --
4 A. Mallow attacked. That's Mallow.
5 Q. Where are you reading?
6 A. Right in the beginning. Dick Mallow felt
7 he ran NASA. Dick Mallow thought he could tell the
8 President of the United States what to do. He went
9 into the White House one time and lectured the
10 President's science adviser. I could not believe it.
11 Q. Dr. Gibbons?
12 A. You bet you.
13 Q. Let me direct your attention now --
14 A. And by the way, I like Dick Mallow. His
15 behavior was abhorrent and not respectful of the
16 President of the United States.
17 Q. Where the two lines are in the left hand
18 column, the colloquy here to O'Connor, "You are
19 assigned an impossible task. Our agreement was to
20 terminate Grumman and Boeing TMIS. Why aren't they
21 cancelled?"
22 Then O'Connor said "Grumman was invited in
0134
1 with the primes and told they will be a sub (CEO
2 meeting)."
3 This references an agreement. Do you know
4 what agreement he is referring to?
5 A. Hey, some of my people are weak and they
6 listen to the dribble that comes out of these kinds
7 of meeting. Dick Mallow didn't run NASA. I run
8 NASA. Dick Mallow doesn't tell NASA what to do. The
9 President of the United States tells NASA what to
10 do. Dick Mallow was in a powerful position and he
11 beat up the NASA people.
12 Everyone has different management styles,
13 his style was one of intimidation, and sometimes
14 people will say we had this agreement. It was an
15 agreement, and the Mafia comes in and puts a horse
16 head in your bed and said we had an agreement you are
17 going to get money every Monday morning. Well, Dick
18 Mallow gave a directive, maybe, I don't know about
19 it, I am reading about this. And then when the
20 people didn't do what he wanted, he got angry. You
21 see "Mallow attacked."
22 Q. Are you saying there was no agreement to
0135
1 terminate Grumman or TMIS?
2 A. Hold on a second. I am reading about this.
3 Q. That you are aware of?
4 A. If I knew about something like this from
5 Dick Mallow, I would have gone to Bob Traxler, the
6 committee chairman, and I would have gone to -- who's
7 the committee chairman -- I would have gone to
8 Traxler and raised holy hell. This is abhorrent.
9 Q. Look at page 677, the lines on the side
10 again that is Mallow.
11 A. Mallow went hyper. That was Dick Mallow.
12 Q. It says "Stokes, my chairman, looks on the
13 Reston contractors as coming off the program to
14 demonstrate the agency resolve to make cost savings.
15 You said they would be off by October 1st," he is
16 talking to Colonel O'Connor, "Our deal to get the
17 Bryne language removed -- with it or without the
18 language. Goldin agreed -- Goldin, the Vice
19 President, all agreed. Mallow kept saying there were
20 900 GACs in Reston." So we are in August of 1993?
21 A. Oh, if you are talking about the Reston
22 coming down, Reston, the decision was made that
0136
1 Reston was going to be closed as part of the decision
2 process we had.
3 Q. The restructure?
4 A. Yes. Reston was to be closed.
5 Q. The facility or contractors terminated?
6 A. The facility in Reston was to be closed.
7 That was part of the decision. Reston was to be
8 closed. In that sense I think Dick was right.
9 Reston was to be closed, absolutely, positively.
10 Q. Did you have an agreement to that effect
11 with anyone on the Hill?
12 A. I don't know about an agreement on the
13 Hill.
14 Q. With Stokes?
15 A. I know that when the decision was made to
16 close Reston, this was part of the redesign. We
17 could only commit to close it, you close it.
18 Absolutely, Reston was to be shut down, that was
19 clear, absolutely clear. And in that sense, I think
20 Dick didn't have to go hyper, but Reston was to be
21 closed, absolutely.
22 Q. And Grumman terminated?
0137
1 A. I did not say that. Reston was to be
2 closed.
3 Q. Did you have --
4 A. Oh, and in its capacity as a Level II
5 contractor because we were not going to have a Level
6 II contractor anymore. In that sense yes. But was
7 Grumman to be eliminated? There was no agreement to
8 eliminate Grumman.
9 Q. Did you have an agreement with Chairman
10 Stokes or any other member of Congress to that
11 effect?
12 A. To eliminate Grumman?
13 Q. No, to close --
14 A. Once a decision was made to close Reston,
15 we were committed to do it as fast as possible.
16 Q. Do you remember when that decision was
17 made? 18 A. No.
19 Q. Was it made before the 22nd of July?
20 A. I don't know.
21 Q. Do you recall indicating on the 22nd of
22 July, that Reston would also be considered as
0138
1 possible host to lead for the restructure program?
2 A. I don't recall that, no. But again, let's
3 define the terms so we are very clear about this.
4 When I refer to it, I am referring to the Level II
5 activity. The Level II activity, the decision was
6 made to shut down the Level II activity on this
7 program as the entire team thought it was eventual.
8 Q. You mean the Reston?
9 A. No, I said the Level II activity. The
10 Level II contractor was to be shut down.
11 Q. Meaning Grumman?
12 A. Meaning that Grumman's activity in Level II
13 it did not preclude Grumman being part of the
14 restructured program. And I am making that
15 distinction very, very clear so that the wrong sense
16 is not drawn into what is said here. Do you
17 understand what I said?
18 Q. I understand. And my difficulty here at
19 the parallel vertical lines at page 677, Mr. Mallow
20 says, "Stokes, my chairman, looks at the Reston
21 contractors as coming off the payroll to demonstrate
22 the agency resolve" or words to that effect. So am I
0139
1 to understand there is -- and that is struck out,
2 Stokes, my Chairman, about the middle of the page.
3 A. I see that. That doesn't preclude they
4 could not go on some other part of the contract.
5 Q. So you had no agreement to terminate
6 Grumman at that point?
7 A. To terminate the Grumman activity in Level
8 II but not terminate Grumman as being a member of the
9 Space Station program.
10 Q. There would b
12 Q. And that would include all the Freedom
13 contractors, not just Grumman, but Boeing,
14 McDonnell-Douglas?
15 A. A complete realignment of relationships.
16 But it was the issue of the Level II contracts. That
17 is why I want to be careful not to call it Reston or
18 not to call it Grumman. It is the Level II contract
19 and Grumman's participation in the Level II
20 contract. That is what we were talking about. That
21 is what they were talking about.
22 Q. Do you know Israel Galvin?
0140
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Who is he?
3 A. He is a contractor who lives in Houston,
4 Texas.
5 Q. Do you recall having dinner with him at
6 Enzo's in Houston and Congressman Brooks, or
7 Frenchies?
8 A. I didn't go to Frenchies for a long time.
9 I recall having lunch with he and Jack Brooks in
10 Houston.
11 Q. Did you ever discuss restructure issues
12 with him, Galvin?
13 A. I don't know.
14 Q. He is a contractor. Was he a contractor on
15 this Space Station program?
16 A. I don't think so. I think the lion share
17 of the work he does is non-NASA commercial work.
18 Q. What is his relationship to Congressman
19 Brooks?
20 A. I think he is a political supporter of
21 Brooks. I think he is a friend of Congressman Brooks
22 too.
0141
1 Q. Did you ever discuss with Mr. Galvin moving
2 the program to Houston?
3 A. Moving the Space Station to Houston?
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. Congressman Brooks certainly wanted it
6 moved to Houston. The first day I met Congressman
7 Brooks he wanted it moved to Houston.
8 Q. Did you discuss it with Mr. Galvin?
9 A. The first day I met Judge Heflin of
10 Alabama, he wanted it moved to Huntsville. The
11 members of Congress always wanted these things.
12 These conversations occur, yes. Could I say it
13 occurred when I had dinner with Jack Brooks and
14 Israel Galvin, I don't know. But I know I had a
15 conversation with Congressman Brooks. The first time
16 I met him he told me that.
17 Q. And Congressman Brooks was important to the
18 continuation, was he not?
19 A. As was 20 or
30 other members.
20 Q. He was particularly important, was he not?
21 MR. BRILLIANT: Objection.
22 THE WITNESS: He was important like
0142
1 George Brown, like Tom DeLay.
2 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
3 Q. Stokes?
4 A. Stokes, yes. There were a group of people
5 all supporters of the program.
6 Q. Did you ever remember meeting Mr. Knowlen
7 in Houston?
8 A. There were a number of social functions I
9 went to in Houston where Knowlen was there and I ran
10 into him.
11 Q. Do you ever remember having a private
12 dinner with him at Enzo's in Houston?
13 A. I can't remember the name of that
14 restaurant.
15 Q. It's out on NASA Road 1, an Italian
16 restaurant just off the freeway on the way to
17 Johnson.
18 A. No. I usually go to Villa Capri. Enzo's
19 doesn't strike me.
20 Q. Do you remember attending any briefings
21 given by the SRT?
22 A. Did I ever go to briefings?
0143
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. When you attended would General Dailey
4 sometimes go, or always go?
5 A. Sometimes.
6 Q. What about Mr. Abbey?
7 A. Sometimes. In fact they may have gone when
8 I didn't go.
9 Q. Was there a usual group from Headquarters
10 that would attend, invariably attend?
11 A. I think so, but I am not sure.
12 Q. Would Mr. Abbey generally be a member of
13 that group?
14 A. I would say generally when I went Abbey
15 went, but not all the time, but I think frequently.
16 We would be there.
17 Q. Would he go sometimes when you did not go?
18 A. I think so.
19 Q. Do you ever remember attending a briefing
20 or being briefed by Mrs. McInerney herself?
21 A. You mean just her in the room or others.
22 Q. May have been others.
0144
1 A. I think I had a few briefings with
2 McInerney.
3 Q. Do you remember a briefing on the 13th of
4 May 1993 about employment layoffs resulting from the
5 options that were being set forth by the SRT?
6 A. I don't recollect a specific briefing on
7 that.
8 Q. That is May 19th not the 13th, a different
9 victim of a typo. Does that help you, the 19th?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Do you ever remember being asked for such
12 information by the White House?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Do you recall asking the SRT to provide you
15 such information?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Concerning potential termination costs?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Or layoffs?
20 A. No.
21 Q. Layoff numbers?
22 A. No.
0145
1 Q. Did you ask them, meaning the SRT, to
2 provide you with a briefing or just numbers orally,
3 or charts or memoranda?
4 A. Say that again.
5 Q. In connection with employment impacts,
6 layoffs, potential termination costs, did you request
7 from the SRT this information?
8 A. I don't recollect, no.
9 Q. Is that the sort of information that
10 normally would be given to you?
11 A. Very rarely. Again, I want to provide
12 context here. One of the things that always graded
13 me was whenever NASA did anything or we would talk
14 about how many jobs were involved, and we would talk
15 about the people who were getting the government
16 money. And one of the things I was determined to do
17 when I came to NASA was to focus on the customer, the
18 American public, and this is not a subject that I
19 have been particularly focused on.
20 In fact if you look at our press releases
21 it used to be how many jobs, and today you don't see
22 how many jobs are involved for the most part because
0146
1 we want to emphasize the outcome of the program, not
2 the people in the program. Now, have I had briefings
3 on those things? I would say occasionally but very
4 infrequently.
5 Q. Do you ever recall being briefed by
6 Ms. McInerney?
7 A. No.
8 MR. ESHELMAN: I want to show you a
9 document that was previously marked as Exhibit 116
10 and ask you if have ever seen this document before.
11 (Exhibit No. 116
12 marked for identification.):
13 THE WITNESS: Is there a date on this
14 document?
15 MR. LITTLEJOHN: No.
16 THE WITNESS: No, I don't recollect seeing
17 it.
18 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
19 Q. The only date we have arises from
20 Ms. McInerney's testimony, when she testified she
21 gave you a briefing on these charts on 19 May 1993.
22 A. I don't recollect that.
0147
1 Q. Were they ever shown to you by counsel in
2 responding to discovery in this case?
3 A. No.
4 Q. I just point out to you that the Bates
5 number of the prefix with H indicates it came from
6 the government files in Houston and pursuant to our
7 request.
8 Let's go to Bates 2138.
9 I direct your attention to this page that
10 is indicating Layoffs, Grumman SSEIC, 870. Do you
11 see that, all the way down, in each of the --
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. That is a complete layoff of Grumman?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. At Reston, Grumman SEEIC?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Do you recall being briefed about complete
18 layoff
of Grumman SSEIC?
19 A. No, I don't.
20 Q. Do you have or know of anything that might
21 refresh your recollection as to whether or not you
22 were briefed on these charts, like a calendar or any
0148
1 notes?
2 A. I don't know of anything, but I'll be happy
3 to look if you want to give me that action.
4 Q. Well, I don't really want to tax you any
5 further than I have to. If you come up with it that
6 would be fine, I would appreciate it.
7 A. I will go take a look.
8 Q. I am interested in it and also that you
9 have been able to do your job without being hassled
10 by me.
11 A. I will try to find out what I can find.
12 Q. Do you recall criticizing adversely
13 employment or layoff or termination numbers on the
14 redesign?
15 A. No.
16 Q. Numbers developed by the SRT?
17 A. No. But I can tell you that I know on
18 numerous occasions when I felt people did sloppy work
19 I am not shy to tell them. If they do crappy work I
20 tell them they better stop doing it.
21 Q. Do you recall indicating to Ms. McInerney
22 that you thought her work fell into that category?
0149
1 A. No, I don't recollect that.
2 Q. Did you ever read her testimony in her
3 deposition in this matter?
4 A. No.
5 Q. Even excerpts from it?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Do you ever recall questioning where any
8 numbers regarding termination costs or layoffs came
9 from in this matter?
10 A. I don't. But again I will provide
11 context. I am very interactive and I hurt people's
12 feelings when I tell them I think they do incomplete
13 work. And when I see something that I think is
14 incorrect or incomplete, I tell them.
15 Q. Ms. McInerney testified that --
16 MR. BRILLIANT: What page?
17 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
18 Q. Following her presentation -- page 291 in
19 her deposition -- she testified that when she
20 provided the information to you, you directed her to
21 destroy the charts.
22 Do you recall that?
0150
1 A. No.
2 Q. Do you ever recall being asked about this?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. By whom?
5 A. I was asked about that by the congressman.
6 Q. That would be Congressman Sensenbrenner?
7 A. I think so.
8 Q. I believe -- you testified you have never
9 seen Ms. McInerney's testimony on this point?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Would it help to read it, do you think?
12 Perhaps we should take a short break and let him read
13 it.
14 A. If you want I will read it, but I have
15 never seen it before.
16 MR. LITTLEJOHN: It is page 289 to about
17 295.
18 (Brief pause in proceedings).
19 MR. ESHELMAN: Back on the record.
20 THE WITNESS: I need to go on the record
21 and clarify something I said.
22 I said Space Station Freedom was dead. It
0151
1 didn't mean that the contractors would go away, but
2 Space Station Freedom itself was dead. And this
3 brought back a recollection of different options,
4 different levels of the Space Station Freedom program
5 would go away. So I don't want you to misconstrue
6 when I said Space Station Freedom was dead, all
7 contractors were terminated and asked to go away. I
8 didn't want a misrepresentation.
9 MR. ESHELMAN: Just for the record,
10 Mr. Goldin just read pages 289 through 297 of
11 Ms. McInerney's deposition.
12 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
13 Q. Does that reading that you just did refresh
14 your recollection in any respect with regard to this
15 exhibit or any exhibit of the type?
16 A. I don't remember the meeting. But I
17 remember numerous meetings where King would come in
18 with incomplete data, sloppy analysis, and it was
19 presented as fait accompli. And I was terribly
20 concerned about it. This particular circumstance I
21 don't remember.
22 Q. Is there anything in Exhibit 116 that would
0152
1 appear to you just off the top to be incomplete or
2 sloppy?
3 A. Yes. The whole discussion Pam had saying,
4 not only about my concerns but she described how the
5 data was collected. It was internal to the team. We
6 were making determinations as to what we thought were
7 the conflict that would be reduced and we were doing
8 that independent of going outside of our team. So we
9 were making judgment decisions over what option A
10 content would be, the scope of making judgments of a
11 whole series of things; in any case, she also talked
12 about somewhere in here about the incompleteness of
13 things, and it was an incomplete analysis from this
14 document.
15 Q. That is from her deposition. But at that
16 time do you recall, would she have briefed you as to
17 how the numbers were developed?
18 A. I don't know.
19 Q. Was option B in that SRT, that was the
20 Freedom derivative?
21 A. That was the Freedom derivative, yes.
22 Q. And was it, was that a non-starter in your
0153
1 mind from the very outset?
2 A. No. I will tell you openly and honestly I
3 favored option C. Because option C represented a
4 single launch to orbit.
5 Q. Like Sky Lab?
6 A. Yes. But option 3 was not selected by the
7 President, so you see decisions get made independent
8 of what I think. And I defended Option B once the
9 President made the decision with every ounce of
10 strength I had in my body.
11 Q. Did anyone other than the team know what
12 the precise options were before the White House
13 selected them?
14 A. Oh, the place leaked life a sieve.
15 Q. So it was an open secret or someone could
16 walk in and pick up a copy of?
17 A. I don't know. I think a lot of people
18 knew. Because it was briefed to the Hill. Once you
19 brief it to the Hill a lot of people know. That is
20 the process in Washington, it is not bad, just the
21 process.
22 Q. Was there any concern on your part that
0154
1 Ms. McInerney was not qualified to develop this
2 information?
3 A. No, she is a very competent capable person.
4 Q. Was there any discussion that the White
5 House should not receive unreliable information or
6 should be informed the information was not reliable
7 yet?
8 A. I don't recollect that that ever was an
9 issue.
10 Q. On June 8th you alluded to this earlier,
11 you recall Congressman Sensenbrenner asking if NASA
12 had -- would provide layoff data to the committee.
13 Do you recall that?
14 A. Well, I saw it because there was a document
15 that came through, I was given a series of questions
16 and in the process I saw the document.
17 Q. Do you recall testifying on June 8th?
18 A. I recall testifying, but I don't recollect
19 that discussion.
20 Q. Do you have any recollection of tasking
21 anyone
to send such data to the committee?
22 A. General procedure at NASA is during a
0155
1 hearing we have legislative affairs there. They take
2 notes. They take all the actions and close out the
3 actions with the Congress. I never get involved in
4 tasking after hearing. I am completely remote from
5 that process. I have never been involved.
6 Q. So if in your testimony you committed to
7 make a provision it would be the responsibility of
8 legislative affairs?
9 A. Exactly.
10 Q. And that would be Chris Hanson?
11 A. No, that was a Freudian slip. It is, at
12 the time it was Jeff Lawrence, his responsibility to
13 get that done.
14 Q. Do you ever recall asking Jim Weatherbee to
15 work with Pam McInerney to develop termination and
16 layoff numbers?
17 A. No. I don't recollect.
18 Q. Would that be something that Mr. Lawrence
19 would have done?
20 A. I don't know. But I want to just come
21 back. If -- and it is not just for me, during a
22 hearing there are multiple people to testify from
0156
1 NASA, it is the job of legislative affairs to close
2 out all the open actions. If I get a letter from the
3 Congress saying an action has not been closed out,
4 then and only then do I go in and talk to legislative
5 affairs people.
6 Q. And remind them gently?
7 A. Not so gently. Because I like to do what I
8 say I do.
9 Q. To clarify and going back a moment and
10 clarifying something you said earlier, were the
11 acquisition options that were being developed by the
12 SRT known outside as well as the other options,
13 design options?
14 A. I don't know. Again this is a recollection
15 of five or six years ago. My recollection was the
16 design options were pretty well known.
17 Q. What about the acquisition options?
18 A. I don't recollect a whole bunch of
19 discussion on that, but I don't have a clear sense.
20 Q. Do you recall meeting with Dr. Caporali on
21 September 24, 1993?
22 A. I remember having a meeting with him. I
0157
1 don't know if it was September 24th, but I remember
2 having a meeting with him.
3 MR. ESHELMAN: I want to show you a
4 document previously marked as Exhibit 195.
5 (Exhibit No. 195
6 marked for identification.)
7 MR. ESHELMAN: This was provided to us from
8 the administrator's files, and I direct your
9 attention to the cover letter dated October 15, 1993,
10 first paragraph.
11 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
12 Q. Does this refresh your recollection of your
13 meeting with Mr. Caporali?
14 A. This letter does not.
15 Q. Meaning 1995, page 646 of that exhibit?
16 A. Right. I had a meeting with him and he
17 came to talk about his concern about the size of the
18 share that Grumman had, that is my recollection.
19 This document here is referring to the subsequent
20 things that happened after that meeting.
21 Q. Do you recall telling Dr. Caporali at that
22 meeting that you had not, were not aware of the bases
0158
1 for the concern that he expressed and that you would
2 look into it, or words to that effect?
3 A. I recollect the meeting. I had a vision of
4 the man in my office talking, and I remember he came
5 in and expressed concern and I didn't have all the
6 information. I remember about that much.
7 Q. And do you recall that concern being
8 reduced from 870 odd to practically zero,
9 functionally zero.
10 A. I don't remember the details, but I
11 remember he had a big level of concern. And I also
12 had not been engaged in the process of the novation.
13 Q. But you do recall the commitment? Look at
14 the second paragraph.
15 A. Well, the only reason I say that, I read
16 the letters today, so what I recollect, and I had
17 seen those letters the last time you were here, so
18 whether I recollect it or whether I saw it in the
19 letter, I don't know. I just don't know. But
20 certainly that was in my letter to him.
21 Q. Do you recall prior to September 24, 1993,
22 being briefed by Captain Shepherd concerning what
0159
1 Boeing intended to do with the SSEIC function? This
2 would be between 14 August when Boeing was selected,
3 or announced on the 17th August, and your meeting
4 with Dr. Caporali on 9-24.
5 A. No, I don't recollect.
6 Q. Do you recall being briefed by anyone,
7 Captain Shepherd, Mr. Weatherbee, or anyone else on
8 the transition team or associated with the
9 restructure redesign transition of the program on
10 termination or of what Boeing intended to do about
11 Grumman's SSEIC?
12 A. I don't recollect any of that. I was on to
13 the next set of tasks at that time.
14 Q. Do you know any reason why Mr. Shepherd's
15 testimony to the effect that he had briefed you on
16 this would be in error?
17 MR. BRILLIANT: Where is that testimony?
18 MR. ESHELMAN: 212 in his deposition.
19 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
20 Q. Is that a no?
21 A. I just don't recollect.
22 Q. Do you recall participating in a meeting
0160
1 where the budget marks for the space station
2 contractors for FY-94 were issued or discussed?
3 A. I go to a lot of meetings and there is a
4 broad range of subjects. I just don't remember those
5 subjects, no.
6 Q. Do you ever recall receiving memoranda or
7 information from the transition team to the effect
8 that Boeing was going to completely terminate or
9 recommend complete termination of Grumman SSEIC?
10 A. I don't recollect it. If the briefing
11 occurred, it occurred. But I have no recollection.
12 Q. Were you ever briefed on a termination of
13 SSEIC before July 22, 1993?
14 A. No.
15 Q. In connection with the SRT, the options
16 that they were considering for acquisition?
17 A. I don't recollect it. Maybe they presented
18 it, maybe they didn't, I just don't recollect.
19 Q. I have a couple of loose ends and then I
20 think we can wrap this up.
21 You were, earlier in your testimony you
22 said something I want to ask you about for context.
0161
1 You indicated that there were renegades in
2 some of these contractors that were going behind or
3 back to Congress or around you some way. Can you
4 tell me who they were?
5 A. I have no idea who they were. There were a
6 bunch of people -- it is hard to describe, but it
7 became like a cult. They were so attached to the
8 project, and they were not bad people, they were just
9 so attached to it they didn't see it was working. I
10 think deep down they believe they were doing the
11 right thing.
12 So by renegade I didn't mean they were bad,
13 but there is a hierarchy that one has to follow in a
14 democracy, and that was the President gives the order
15 and I carry out that order and I'll do whatever I can
16 within legal ethical limits to carry out that order.
17 Q. Who of your people went to Congress to get
18 you to stop redesign?
19 A. I would say a lion share of the people who
20 worked at NASA Headquarters in the Space Station
21 office.
22 Q. Meaning Level II?
0162
1 A. I don't know what it is called. The people
2 at NASA Headquarters, they genuinely loved Space
3 Station Freedom.
4 Q. Mr. Aldridge, was he going to Congress?
5 A. One of the things I don't do, I don't track
6 who is doing things. When there is a leak to the
7 press one of the things I stop doing here is
8 searching for who did it.
9 Q. Do you know to whom they went in Congress,
10 whether it be NASA or contractor people?
11 A. All over Congress I presume. Contractors
12 went there, interest groups went there. Sometimes
13 they would even tell me they were doing it. Groups
14 came up from Houston, Texas, public support groups.
15 They would come visit me and say hey we are going to
16 Congress to try to keep Freedom alive. I would say
17 you are going to lose.
18 Q. Was Economic Development Authority one such
19 group?
20 A. I don't know. There were a group of people
21 from Alabama. They told me they were going to do it.
22 Q. And were they civic or NASA group?
0163
1 A. It was a group of civic people, NASA
2 people. This is the democratic process. Some did it
3 openly, some did it behind the scenes. Some had
4 relationships.
5 Q. Do you recall to whom you were referring
6 when you were talking about the speech that was given
7 before 500 people --
8 A. I can't remember the name of the fellow. I
9 remember he had a goatee.
10 Q. We have requested tapes and have not gotten
11 any tapes of speeches. You refer to this tape. Do
12 you know where a copy of it is?
13 A. I can try to find one. I saw it in 1992,
14 that is one of the first things my staff showed me
15 when I came in, they showed me that tape. I didn't
16 have retention of it.
17 Q. Like Leroy Houk, the director of AIA?
18 A. I don't know. It was some professional
19 meeting, and I was absolutely flabbergasted.
20 Q. You had indicated so --
21 A. Andy Stofan said it at one of these
22 meetings.
0164
1 Q. Was that a tag up?
2 A. It was a big meeting, I don't know what it
3 was, and I know Andy, he is a very open guy, and he
4 said it, I was flabbergasted. I think the statement
5 was, "You would think we should organize Space
6 Station Freedom from management efficiency. No, we
7 organized it for political expediency."
8 Q. You were earlier in your testimony today
9 reciting the litany of travails you went through at
10 the outset of your tenure as administrator, you
11 indicated you had been accused of criminal action.
12 What type of criminal action?
13 A. I don't remember, but they did it.
14 Q. Who did it?
15 A. I don't remember who. It is just things
16 stick in your memory. It got pretty vicious here.
17 People threatened me.
18 Q. Physically?
19 A. No. With reputation. They threatened me
20 they would get me removed from office.
21 Q. This was contractors, NASA people?
22 A. Yes, yes, keep going.
0165
1 Q. Congressman?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Which Congressman?
4 A. I don't remember which. In fact it came to
5 me indirectly. No one openly said it to my face.
6 Q. Staffers?
7 A. Little birdies came to see me.
8 Q. Did Mr. Mallow threaten you?
9 A. You know, they never say who they are, but
10 they come with all the threats.
11 Q. Now, Grumman SSEIC was terminated by NASA.
12 A. I can't validate that.
13 Q. We have that. We have testimony that it
14 was done on the recommendation of Boeing,
15 particularly Doug Stone the program manager for
16 Boeing, recommended it to Bryan O'Connor who sent it
17 to the contractors officer who acted on it. Now,
18 this occurred prior to the final configuration that
19 was selected with the Russians. Was this decision
20 ever brought to your attention?
21 MR. BRILLIANT: I object to the form of the
22 question. First of all it is complex.
0166
1 Second, it assumes facts not in evidence.
2 MR. ESHELMAN: Which facts?
3 MR. BRILLIANT: Generally it characterizes
4 a whole transaction of recommendations of one to
5 another. Based on your characterization of
6 deposition testimony that is not before the witness,
7 and including the deposition which we have objected
8 to the appropriateness of it altogether because of
9 lack of adequate notice to the government about the
10 change in the venue of that deposition. That is the
11 Stone deposition.
12 I don't object to your asking a direct
13 question, but I object to your inserting all that
14 testimony into the transcript as background. It
15 tends to color or create possible inferences in the
16 answer that may not be intended by the witness.
17 If you ask the witness a straight question,
18 he will give you a straight answer.
19 MR. ESHELMAN: I regret the government
20 found it inconvenient to accommodate a third party
21 deponent, in terms of where the deposition would
22 occur, in this case a Boeing person. My question,
0167
1 however --
2 MR. BRILLIANT: On a day's notice.
3 MR. ESHELMAN: Where it was originally
4 scheduled, I might add.
5 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
6 Q. My question remains, were you ever in the
7 loop or hear any discussion or consulted on the
8 termination of Grumman SSEIC?
9 A. I don't recollect being in the loop at that
10 phase of the program.
11 MR. ESHELMAN: I want to take a five minute
12 break here.
13 (Brief pause in proceedings).
14 MR. ESHELMAN: Back on the record.
15 I have just a couple of little follow-ups.
16 Mr. Goldin, first of all, I want to thank
17 you, it has been a pleasure seeing you again, and you
18 have been very helpful.
19 I want to show you a document now that has
20 been previously marked as Exhibit 163.
21 And I point out to you that the last page
22 of it is the 4 June letter I had previously shown
0168
1 you.
2 (Exhibit No. 163
3 Marked for identification.)
4 MR. BRILLIANT: This is approximately a 25
5 or 26 page document, are you going to ask --
6 MR. ESHELMAN: I am going to ask if he has
7 ever seen it before.
8 THE WITNESS: Who wrote it?
9 MR. ESHELMAN: Go to Exhibit 250, the
10 letter I showed you previously. My only question --
11 THE WITNESS: This document, this here I
12 saw previously so --
13 BY MR. ESHELMAN:
14 Q. Sir, at the bottom, page 27.
15 A. No.
16 Q. You have never seen it?
17 A. "It is the purpose of this document to bring
18 to your attention of potential fraud, waste, abuse
19 and mismanagement involving the Administrator of NASA
20 and his immediate staff. The victims of the fraud are
21 the White House, the Congress, the American taxpayer
22 and the Space Station Program team of the United
0169
1 States and International Partners."
2 Q. I just wondered if that was something to
3 which you were referring when you were saying you
4 were under attack?
5 A. No. But this is exactly the kind of thing
6 that happened. I didn't see this, but I have seen
7 other things that looked like it. No, I have never
8 seen this document. I had not been aware. Did they
9 sign it.
10 Q. This is a draft document that was provided
11 to us pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum to a third
12 party. One of the authors --
13 A. Will I be allowed to read this document?
14 Q. Yes, it is a document in evidence.
15 A. Does JC indicate it is from Johnson?
16 Q. No, John Cox. That was the provider.
17 A. It even has space shuttle Columbia. I have
18 seen other things similar to this. Usually they are
19 anonymous.
20 Q. You never discussed this with Mr. Shepherd,
21 Captain Shepherd?
22 A. I have not seen this document. I don't
0170
1 recollect seeing this document.
2 Q. I understand you have not seen it and I
3 won't take any more of your valuable time.
4 A. No, I was not aware, in fact I am very
5 surprised.
6 MR. ESHELMAN: No further questions.
7 MR. BRILLIANT: We have no questions.
8 We will read and sign.
9 (Thereupon, at 5:10 p.m., the deposition
10 was concluded).
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
0171
1 010601
2 CERTIFICATE OF DEPONENT
3 I hereby certify that I have read the foregoing Pages
4 5 through 170 of my deposition testimony taken in
5 this proceeding and with the exception of changes
6 and/or corrections, if any, find them to be a true
7 and correct transcription thereof.
8
9 __________________________
10 Daniel S. Goldin
11
12 __________________________
13 DATE
14
15
16 CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
17 Subscribed and sworn to before me this the
18 ____________ day of _________________________, 1999.
19 __________________________
20 NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR
21
22 My commission expires:
0172
1 CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC
2 I, WILLIAM J. ALLEN, the officer before
3 whom the foregoing proceeding occurred, Pages 5
4 through 170, do hereby certify that the witness
5 therein was duly sworn; that the testimony of said
6 witness was taken by me and thereafter reduced to
7 this typewritten transcript under my supervision;
8 that said transcript is a true record of the
9 testimony given by said witness; that I am neither
10 counsel for, related to, nor employed by any of the
11 parties to the proceeding; and, further, that I am
12 not a relative or an employee of any attorney or
13 counsel employed by the parties thereto, nor
14 financially nor otherwise interested in the outcome
15 of the proceeding, or any action involved therewith.
16 Witness my Signature and Seal:
17 My commission expires:
18 May 14, 2002
19 ---------------------------
20 WILLIAM J. ALLEN
21 Notary Public in and
22 for the District of Columbia
0173
1 010601
2 WITNESS: DANIEL S. GOLDIN
3 DATE: January 6, 1999
4 Please note any errors and the corrections thereof on
5 this errata sheet. Rules require a reason for any
6 change or correction. May be general, such as "To
7 correct stenographic error," or "To clarify the
8 record," or "To conform with the facts."
9 PAGE LINE CORRECTION REASON FOR CHANGE,