The Aldridge Commission observed that "NASA's organization chart is not wired for success. The first task is to realign the NASA Headquarters organizations to support the long-term vision. There are currently too many mission-focused enterprises and the mission support functions are excessively diffuse." It then recommended that NASA and Congress "work with NASA to create 3 new NASA organizations: a technical advisory board that would give the Administrator and NASA leadership independent and responsive advice on technology and risk mitigation plans; an independent cost estimating organization to ensure cost realism and accuracy; and a research and technology organization that sponsors high risk/high payoff technology advancement while tolerating periodic failures."

This recommendation (and others) would require for some substantial changes within the agency. O'Keefe had already seen this train coming and had a transformation plan already well defined when the Aldridge Commission's report was released. By virtue of having done so much in public it was straightforward for O'Keefe to see where they were going.

On June 24th Sean O'Keefe began the process of transforming the Agency. This process began at NASA Headquarters. O'Keefe framed the news he would unveil by referring to two things he had heard since he had arrived that affected his decisions. First was the common plea that "we need a strategic direction. We need a focus." We got that on January 14th" O'Keefe said. The second thing he had heard was the prevailing logic that the agency was 'one accident away form going out of business'. "This was asserted as if there was no debate." O'Keefe said. "Guess what: it did not happen!"

O'Keefe sought to focus all of NASA on its core values and to create a clear roadmap of where the agency was going to go; restructure and increase the integration of how the agency works; and enhance the level accountability across the entire agency.

As for the details: one would be the use of the term 'codes' to denote various offices. This practice had its origins in the alphabet system of routing mail to various offices and grew into a parallel language that described organizations- with out using their names. This was, of course, a feature at all field centers. Some used letters (all in a different syntax than headquarters), some used numbers, some used both. O'Keefe was tired of this organizational balkanization and sought to impose a single, easily understandable system across the agency. Indeed he would soon start to joke that anyone using "code" to describe a part of the agency would have to drop a dollar in a MWR (morale, welfare and recreation) Fund jar by the door.

He also sought to consolidate roles and responsibilities in a way that focused energies and resources along functional lines - not disperse them. Such a dispersal had been Dan Goldin's way of running the agency. In order to avoid having any one person wield too much power (with the exception of George Abbey of course who ran his own fiefdom within Johnson Space Center) Goldin broke up large offices into smaller ones - increasing the number of Associate Administrators every time. Some joked that he might soon need an other alphabet with more letters.

By dispersing authority, Goldin was able to manage the agency more easily - since no one person or office could thwart his plans. Despite the somewhat emasculating effect it had on people and organizations Goldin's approach did actually provided a curious sort of stability for the agency. While NASA was no longer known as an energetic center of innovation, it none the less managed to retain the status quo rather well - even as Goldin championed 7 years of cuts to the agency's overall budget. Alas, this organization Goldin left behind was best suited for keeping the pilot light on - not firing an afterburner and leaping on to new challenges.

O'Keefe would tackle this problem head on. Enterprises and various offices would disappear. Instead, new directorates would be formed. The Space Operations Directorate, which would manage missions being performed in space would be headed by Associate Administrator for Space Flight Bill Readdy. The Exploration Systems Directorate would be run by Craig Steidle. The old Office of Biological and Physical Research (OBPR) would be absorbed into Steidle's directorate. Former OBPR AA Mary Kicza would become the new Associate Deputy Administrator for Systems Integration.

The Science Mission Directorate would be comprised of the old Office of Space Science and the Office of Earth Science and would be run by Goddard Space Flight Center director Al Diaz. Former AA for Space Science Ed Weiler would move to become the new center director at Goddard. Former AA for Earth Science, Ghassem Asrar would become Diaz's Deputy and would also serve as Chief Exploration Scientist. The Aeronautics Directorate would be run by current Office of Aeronautics AA Victor Lebacqz.

The previous NASA Headquarters offices of Public Affairs, External Relations, and Legislative Affairs would now all be overseen by a new Mission Support Directorate in headed by an Assistant Administrator who would report directly to O'Keefe.

All other organizations would at Headquarters would be tweaked a bit, but would otherwise remain unchanged.

This new NASA headquarters organization would be run by a new Strategic Planning Council (SPC). Gone would be the Executive Council and the Joint Strategic Assessment Committee. (JSAC). The SPC would be chaired by O'Keefe. Its members would include Deputy Administrator Fred Gregory, Bill Readdy, Craig Steidle, Al Diaz, Victor Lebacqz, ADA for Integration Mary Kicza, ADA for Institutions and Asset Management Jim Jennings, and a new ADA for communications.

Ex officio members of the SPC would include NASA Chief of Staff John Schumacher, NASA Comptroller Steve Isakowitz, Chief Exploration Scientist Ghassem Asrar, and Charles Elachi who would now serve as the agency's Director of Strategic Planning while still retaining his JPL center director position.

In addition to these changes, all of the agency's field center Chief Financial Officers (CFO) would now report directly to NASA's CFO Gwen Brown at NASA Headquarters. Previously, all of the center CFOs had reported to their respective center directors. As NASA sought to reform its Byzantine financial management system - one wherein every center had their own way of doing things - it soon became clear that the agency needed to take additional steps such that everyone everywhere was singing from the same song sheet.

In addition to central coordination of financial management, NASA would also seek to firm up the management of its corporate image - communications and legislative affairs. Among the changes was having the public affairs operations at each center begin to coordinate their activities under the direct management of NASA headquarters.

As the Summer progressed, additional personnel changes would be announced which sought to further tighten and coordinate this new 'corporate' style of NASA management with more and more coordination coming to Headquarters - away for the field centers.

A decade earlier, Dan Goldin had sought to give more authority to the field centers. The net result was what came to be called "stove piping" where all centers began dueling fiefdoms - all intent on having their own min-NASA complete with efforts which unabashedly duplicated those resident at other centers. Everyone had a piece of something. Headquarters was often reduced to negotiating with its field centers instead of directing them. Given the way Goldin had diluted the power base at headquarters, the field centers got away with it. O'Keefe now sought to reverse that pendulum - and retool the agency as needed to accomplish the challenge that lay ahead.

• NASA Releases New Organization Chart
• Administrator Unveils Next Steps of NASA Transformation

News from Commercial Space Watch