October 28, 2003

This version of the plan is online at NASA at http://www.nasa.gov/pdf/53067main_station_imp_plan.pdf

PREFACE

The loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia and its crew was devastating for the entire NASA family. For the International Space Station (ISS) Program, finding our way through this tragic loss begins with an unwavering commitment to learn from this tragedy. We will reshape the ISS Program based on those lessons, and carry out the Administrator's directive to continue our mission of building, operating and performing research on the ISS effectively and safely.

We are committed to those actions that will help return the Shuttle to flight and, in turn, will support our exploration and science objectives. The crew of Columbia was dedicated to this vision of science and exploration and devoted their lives to further it. It is our job to continue their vision.

This document details the ISS plans for accepting the findings, complying with the recommendations applicable to ISS, and embracing the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) Report. The CAIB Report identifies systemic issues that directly or indirectly affect the way we plan, develop, and operate. We will address those CAIB issues and describe how the ISS Program is moving forward on a comprehensive set of process improvements.

This ISS Continuing Flight Implementation Plan captures a snapshot of our review of lessons learned from the Columbia accident and how we will work to implement these lessons into the ISS Program. We will periodically update this document as our review and reassessment of procedures and processes identifies needed changes and technical options for improvements. Updates to this plan will reflect new understanding, increased maturity, and decisions. We will also update this document to include responses to the CAIB observations and other CAIB Report Volumes as they are released.

The response summary provides an overview of the ISS Program's response to the initial CAIB recommendations and to process improvement actions. Part 1 provides a detailed discussion of activities undertaken by NASA to implement the applicable CAIB recommendations. Part 2 discusses additional NASA actions taken as a result of internal reviews and working group recommendations in addition to those made by the CAIB and, in the next update, will contain the Board's observations.

The Columbia tragedy serves as strong reminder that space flight is harshly unforgiving of engineering deficiencies, overconfidence, system or human error, and inaccurate risk assessments. The ISS Program's part in the return to flight efforts requires us to continue to identify, understand, control, and mitigate the risk unique to the ISS while accomplishing the mission entrusted to us. We do so with the memories of our dear friends and colleagues—the crew of STS-107—serving as both an inspiration and an imperative to succeed safely.

SUMMARY

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB) addressed both the direct and the contributing causes of the Columbia accident and documented its results in the CAIB Report, issued in August 2003. The CAIB Report addressed issues that are critical not only for the Space Shuttle Program, but for NASA as a whole. NASA accepts the findings, will comply with the recommendations, and embraces the Report. In addition, NASA is analyzing the report for applicability to other programs including the International Space Station (ISS) Program.

The Space Shuttle Return to Flight Planning Team is focusing on the actions necessary to return the Shuttle safely to flight. ISS Program personnel are participating fully in these important initiatives, and their joint effort is addressed in Volume 1 of NASA's response to the CAIB Report: NASA's Implementation Plan for Space Shuttle Return to Flight and Beyond. In addition, NASA is pursuing an in-depth assessment of its organization with the objective of aggressively implementing corrective actions. NASA chartered the ISS Continuing Flight Team (CFT) to review the CAIB Report and determine the areas that are applicable to the ISS Program and ensure there are actions in place addressing those areas. The purpose of this document—Volume 2 of NASA's response to the CAIB Report: NASA's Implementation Plan for International Space Station Continuing Flight—is to document these findings and our progress towards completion of necessary actions.

As with Volume 1, Volume 2 will continue to evolve as our understanding of the activity needed to address each issue matures. We anticipate periodically updating Volume 2 to reflect changes to the plan and progress toward implementing the lessons learned from the CAIB Report as they relate to the ISS Program. Volume 2 updates will also include responses to the observations and any additional relevant lessons from the remaining volumes of the CAIB Report that are scheduled for release soon. Reaping the lessons learned from the Columbia accident and the CAIB's results started immediately after the accident. While the CAIB was conducting its investigation, the ISS Program began an intensive effort to examine its own processes and operations under a continuous improvement initiative. One of the objectives was to identify the existence of any risk that has not been reduced to the lowest level and to focus management attention on the residual risks that cannot be eliminated. As the CAIB released its preliminary results, the ISS Program assessed them for applicability. Other continuous improvement activities were derived from the experience the ISS Program has gained from 3 years of crewed ISS operations and 5 years of ISS system operation.

Continuing Flight Team Assessment and Implementation Plan Organization

The Continuing Flight Team (CFT) assessed every CAIB recommendation and observation for applicability to the ISS. Some of the CAIB recommendations were specific to Space Shuttle design or processes. Others affect NASA safety and engineering processes as a whole. The CAIB Report provides valuable lessons learned applicable to the ISS Program. Part 1 of this volume addresses the CAIB recommendations that were found to be applicable to the ISS. Although some of these recommendations do not specifically apply to the ISS, their underlying intent provides valuable insights that contribute to improving ISS processes. Part 2 of this volume addresses many of the ISS Program areas of continuous improvement. The CAIB observations will be addressed in Part 2 in the next revision.

Where the underlying intent of any recommendation is addressed by another recommendation documented in Part 1 or a continuous improvement area documented in Part 2, the location of the text that addresses the subject will be referenced.

Reaping the Benefits of the IMCE Assessment

The CAIB report makes several references to the ISS Management and Cost Evaluation (IMCE) Task Force that conducted an in-depth review of the ISS Program cost, schedule, technical, and management infrastructure.

This Task Force was a direct result of the President's fiscal year 2002 (FY2002) Budget Blueprint, which laid groundwork for attaining cost control and regaining ISS Program credibility needed to fulfill the ISS full potential and international commitments. The Task Force conducted independent assessments of the ISS Program and provided 12 recommendations to NASA in an IMCE report released on November 1, 2001. These recommendations provided a roadmap to improve ISS Program management and cost controls.

In response to the IMCE findings and recommendations, the ISS Program implemented a reliable and effective cost-estimating and management system that provides a structured and disciplined program to manage cost and risks.

ISS Operations Are Ongoing

The grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet following the loss of Columbia has had a profound effect on the ISS Program. The loss of capabilities provided by the Space Shuttle has resulted in a delay in the assembly of ISS and has greatly reduced the cargo mass available for resupply and research. The loss of down mass has impacted our ability to return failed hardware, results of scientific investigations, and environmental samples. In response to these challenges, a plan to allow continued crewed operations of the ISS was developed and agreed to by all ISS Partners. This plan requires the Russian Progress spacecraft be used to supply cargo and crews be rotated with the Russian Soyuz vehicle. This plan is being implemented with the cooperation and efforts of all Partners.

On October 18, 2003, the Expedition 8 crew was launched on a Russian Soyuz vehicle to the ISS. The two-person crew, comprised of Commander Mike Foale and Flight Engineer Alexander Kaleri, is scheduled to spend 192 days on board the ISS, conducting research, and maintaining ISS systems. The Expedition 7 crew, Commander Yuri Malenchenko and ISS Science Officer Edward Lu, will return to Earth on October 28, 2003, after spending 185 days on orbit. As a taxi crew member on the ISS crew exchange, Spanish European Space Agency Astronaut Pedro Duque will spend 8 days on the ISS performing a variety of experiments. The ISS Program team remains focused on conducting its mission while safely supporting our crew.

ISS Partnership Is Strong

The ISS International Partnership has stepped up to the challenge of keeping the ISS crewed and operating safely as NASA works through the activities to return the Space Shuttle to flight. Although the grounding of the Space Shuttle has been a challenge to ISS operations, the spirit of partnership that has built the ISS will sustain the ISS through this difficult period.

The integrated international nature of the ISS Program and its operation has emphasized the need for clear communication and coordination at all levels of the Program structure. One of the keys to the success of the ISS Program, due to its integrated international nature, has been establishing and maintaining clear communications and coordination among the International Partners at all levels of the Program structure. As we gain experience in operating the ISS, we realize improvements in communication that lead to an increased efficiency. The grounding of the Space Shuttle fleet, and the associated constraints on up mass and down mass, has brought further improvements in communication among the Partner teams.

NASA will continue to work closely with its International Partners and keep the lines of communication open as the ISS Program implements process improvements and enhancements as a result of lessons learned from Columbia. These changes will be implemented within the framework of our international agreements.

Conclusion

This initial ISS CFT Implementation Plan summarizes the results of our review to date of the lessons learned from the loss of Columbia and the ISS continuous improvement initiative. It identifies current responsive implementations, outlines technical and management options under consideration to improve the ISS Program and reduce risk, and identifies forward work where solutions are in development.

As ISS continues to fly, the safety of the crew and the vehicle are paramount. As we learn from the loss of Columbia and its crew, we must remember that while the Shuttle fleet may be grounded, we still have U.S., Russian, and other International Partner astronauts flying in space. Providing a safe environment for them to conduct research and operate the ISS is our most critical challenge.

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