Statement By Norman R. Augustine
Chair of Committee on the Future of the U.S. Space Program (1990)
Committee on Science
United States House of Representatives
Washington, D.C.
March 10, 2004
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for
the invitation to appear before you today. I am pleased that you
are taking this opportunity to examine America's space program
and hope that a plan can be created which will endure over time
and in which all Americans can take pride.
Before making my statement I should, in the spirit of full
disclosure, call to your attention that I am a retiree and Board
Member of the Lockheed Martin Corporation, a former President
of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, a
former director of The Planetary Society and a former chairman of
the Aerospace Industry Association.
I have been asked to address the findings of the Committee
on the Future of the U.S. Space Program, a committee which was
established approximately fourteen years ago by then-President
Bush. I will briefly summarize what I believe were some of our more significant findings and recommendations and, as you have
requested, close with a few brief observations of my own.
It goes without saying that a great deal has changed since the
commission which I chaired conducted its work. Today there is no
Soviet Union dedicating substantial resources to maintain its own
dynamic space program—and thereby providing a competitive
impetus to America's space program. In fact, rather than the
Soviets and the U.S. being adversaries in space, the company I
recently had the privilege of serving is now a partner in launching
commercial spacecraft with those same Soviet enterprises that
conducted the USSR space program of an earlier era—a notion that
would have been unimaginable during the period preceding our
committee's deliberations.
And there have been other significant changes which have
impacted America's space program during the period which has
intervened. For example,
China is emerging as a major space participant, having
recently taken particularly significant steps toward full
membership in the space community.
The United States has not realized the ten percent annual
growth in the NASA budget that was forecast by virtually all
senior officials in both the Executive Branch and the
Congress at the time our commission commenced its work.
In fact, NASA's budget, although still significant, has
diminished in real terms.
The commercial space business, (constructing and launching
spacecraft) which seemed to hold such great promise a
decade ago has largely been reduced to a commodity market
and as such has, from an economic standpoint at least, been a
disappointment.
America's space industrial base has shrunk from a number of
relatively healthy aerospace companies to a very few firms
still maintaining strong space credentials . . . this being
largely a consequence of the restructuring of the aerospace
industry which occurred when defense spending dropped
precipitously following the end of the Cold War.
And there still seems to be no broad consensus as to what
America's long-term space program should comprise.
On the other hand, a great deal has not changed. For
example,
Today we meet, as did our committee, in the wake of a
failure of the Space Shuttle . . . in our case, the Challenger.
There continues to be strong grassroots support for a space
program, however, the transformation of that interest into
budgetary measures has not been evident.
There remain severe competing and legitimate pressures for
federal funds . . . with the need to counter terrorism
supplanting certain of the demands of the Cold War.
The number of U.S. citizens studying engineering has
continued to decline, even in the midst of the greatest
technological explosion in history—an explosion which is
growing our economy and modifying our lifestyle at a pace
never before witnessed. Meanwhile, the scientific and
technological capacities of many other nations are increasing
markedly.
America's K-12 educational system remains in extremis,
especially in the areas of science and technology—disciplines
where space activity seems to be one of the few pursuits that
truly inspires many of our young people.
There remains continuing concern over the apparent loss of
some of NASA's innovativeness, management acumen and
systems engineering skill. At the same time, NASA, without
question, remains the finest space organization in the world,
producing remarkable accomplishments on a continuing basis
and doing so openly and publicly for all to observe . . . for
better or for worse. Nonetheless, few would confuse the
NASA of today with the NASA of the Apollo era.
Unfortunately, much of the public, and, of even greater
concern, some at NASA, seem to take for granted these
incredible achievements. Dan Goldin, when he was serving
as Administrator of NASA, shared with me an incident concerning a citizen who had complained to him about
NASA spending substantial sums of money on
meteorological satellites, asking, "Why do we need
meteorological satellites? We have the weather channel".
I would like now to turn to some of our commission's
findings and recommendations. They are, I believe, surprisingly
relevant today, even though well over a decade has passed since
they were first stated. I will cite thirteen of the more significant of
these findings and will address each only very briefly in deference
to the time available.
First, we found a NASA which was badly overcommitted in
terms of the funding demands of the programs it was
undertaking as compared with the funding which was
available. The Space Shuttle and the Space Station were
major consumers of that budget, leaving little room for other
initiatives while making smaller projects highly vulnerable to the consequences of cost-growth in these two major
programs. A primary concern was the lack of adequate
reserves in terms of time, schedule and technological
approaches—a condition which exacerbated the potential
impact of risks already inherent in NASA's challenging
endeavors.
Second, in the post-Apollo period there seemed to be a lack
of a broadly embraced national goal for our space program
. . . some would even say that America was lost in space. At
the same time, our commission believed that it was
inappropriate to set a firm date to achieve a specific major
space goal given the then-prevailing budgetary
circumstances. Rather, we felt it was important to invest first
in building a solid technological foundation for whatever was
to be America's long-term program and thereafter to conduct
that program on what we called a "go-as-you-pay" basis . . .
an approach that was recognized as differing markedly from the highly successful strategy adopted by President Kennedy
for the Apollo program. Our recommendation was merely a
reflection of the fact that times had changed and that large
sums of additional near-term money to underpin a major
space venture, such as a human Mars program, were unlikely
to be forthcoming.
Third, we concluded that America's space program should be
a balanced program, involving both humans in space and the
use of robotic spacecraft. Although there were those who
exclusively advocated robotic systems, it was our belief that
public support for the overall space program would diminish
rapidly were the nation to adopt a purely unmanned approach
to space exploration. As we pointed out in our report, the
difference between Hillary reaching the summit of Mt.
Everest and simply lobbing a rocket carrying an electronic
package to the mountain's crest is immense in terms of the
inspiration humankind derives from the feat.
Fourth, we concluded that science should be the first priority
of our space program . . . since science is the basis of new
knowledge and thereby forms the underpinning of
technological progress.
Fifth, there should be a mission to the planet earth as well as
a mission from the planet earth, the former focusing on the
earth's biosphere and the need to protect our planet from
harmful activities which take place here on earth.
Sixth, space transportation was, and I might note is, the
primary impediment to a continuing healthy space program.
It was concluded that we should not use humans in space
merely as "truck drivers" . . . rather, we should limit their
role to instances where humans insitu can in fact make a
difference. In short, we urgently needed to mitigate our
dependence on the Space Shuttle for logistical missions.
Seventh, very high priority was placed on developing a new
unmanned (but potentially man-ratable) launch vehicle with a
relatively heavy lift capability. In this regard, we
recommended, as an economic move, that no additional
Shuttles be built.
Eighth, the operation of the Space Shuttle should not be
viewed, as had increasingly been the case in the late 1980s,
as being somewhat analogous to running an airline. The
Shuttle was, and is, best characterized as an advanced
development program operating in a very unforgiving
environment.
Ninth, we noted quite explicitly that it was not a matter of if
we would lose another Space Shuttle but only a matter of
when. This unfortunate conclusion was based on our belief
that the reliability estimates which were then being attributed to the Shuttle were grossly optimistic. In fact, we predicted
that such a loss would probably occur "in the next several
years" and we went on to note that if America does not have
the will to endure occasional losses—having taken all
reasonable steps to try to avoid them—we should then
reconsider whether our nation belongs in space at all. Space
is inherently a dangerous and risky place . . . one which is
altogether unforgiving of human failings. No one realizes
this more than the astronauts who fly our machines into
space.
Tenth, the Space Station program needed to be restructured
to place it on a more conservative schedule and more realistic
financial basis, importantly including the provision of
adequate reserves.
Eleventh, there was a need to proceed with dispatch in the
development of some form of a space rescue vehicle . . . a vehicle which could perhaps perform other important
missions as well.
Twelfth, we concluded that a human trip to Mars is the
correct long-term goal for America's space program, using
the moon as a stepping-stone along the way. Other possible
missions were considered, including establishing a permanent
station at the neutral gravity point in the earth-moon system.
This would in fact produce a useful way-station for
exploration of deeper space, however it provides an
altogether uninteresting locale for most other forms of
scientific enterprise. Alternatively, one could increase the
effort focused on earth-orbiting spacecraft, however, the
Space Station seemed to be handling that goal very
adequately and was itself likely to suffer from the law of
diminishing returns in the longer-term. Missions to Phobos
and Deimos appeared exciting, but could be accomplished as
a part of a Mars project. Missions to other space objects would seem to be candidates for the more distant future.
Thus, a return to the moon followed by a Mars mission
seemed to us to be the correct long-term goal for America's
space program.
Thirteenth, and lastly, NASA's management structure,
engineering approach and overhead costs needed to be
streamlined. As with many mature organizations, the drive
toward self-perpetuation seemed to be overtaking enthusiasm
for innovation. The various Centers were often engaged in
non-constructive competition with one another, seemingly
united only in their not-infrequent skirmishes with NASA
headquarters.
That, then, summarizes the principal findings of our
commission of fourteen years ago. As I have noted, most of these
observations seem quite relevant even today.
Now, with your permission, I would like to conclude my
remarks with four very brief observations not on behalf of our
commission but on my own stead.
First, if America is to have a robust space program it is
critical that we build a national consensus as to what that program
should comprise. If, for example, we are to pursue an objective
that requires twenty years to achieve, that then implies we must
have the sustained support of five consecutive presidential
administrations, ten consecutive Congresses and twenty
consecutive federal budgets—a feat the difficulty of which seems
to eclipse any technological challenge space exploration may
engender. This consideration argues for a major space undertaking
that could be accomplished in step-wise milestones, each
contributing to a uniting long-term goal. Such an approach has the
added advantage that it reduces the risk associated with individual
steps. It is this consideration which justifies a mission to Mars with an initial step to the moon—as philosophically opposed to a
return to the moon with a potential visit to Mars.
Second, I believe that the exploration of space with humans
offers many scientific, technological and economic benefits. But
these tangible benefits are, in my opinion, not sufficient in
themselves to justify the cost of the undertaking. To do the latter
one must assign value to intangibles, intangibles such as the
excitement of exploring the unknown; of creating new knowledge;
of stimulating science and engineering education; of undertaking
challenging and inspiring goals; and of demonstrating to the world
what America can do when it puts its mind to a task. Critics will
of course suggest that we cannot afford such "luxuries" in a time of
great and legitimate demands to address compelling earthly
problems—but if they are correct, one must also ask whether we
can then afford football stadiums, Hollywood entertainment, golf
courses and a thousand other well accepted pursuits.
Third, and this is extremely important, it would be a grave
mistake to try to pursue a space program "on the cheap". To do so
is in my opinion an invitation to disaster. There is a tendency in
any "can-do" organization to believe that it can operate with
almost any budget that is made available. The fact is that trying to
do so is a mistake—particularly when safety is a major
consideration. I am not arguing for profligacy; rather, I am simply
pointing out that space activity is expensive and that it is difficult.
One might even say that it is rocket science!
Significant funding will still be required for many years to
support the operation of the Space Station and Space Shuttle. The
NASA infrastructure itself absorbs substantial funds, as does the
very important NASA research program. And there is always the
problem that technology advances so rapidly that any project
proceeding at too leisurely a pace will find itself constantly
undertaking redesigns due to the obsolescence of the components it
incorporates . . . sort of a never-ending "do-loop".
And finally, as a general observation, I would like to strongly
affiliate myself with the President's recently announced plan to
send humans to Mars and to do so via a lunar way-station. Oneday
humans will stand on Mars. The only question is when . . . and
who. The first Martian may well be in the fourth grade right now.
Hopefully, somewhere in the United States.
Thank you.
NORMAN R. AUGUSTINE was raised in Colorado and attended Princeton University
where he graduated with a BSE in Aeronautical Engineering, magna cum laude, an MSE
and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa, Tau Beta Pi and Sigma Xi.
In 1958 he joined the Douglas Aircraft Company in California where he held titles of
Program Manager and Chief Engineer. Beginning in 1965, he served in the Pentagon in
the Office of the Secretary of Defense as an Assistant Director of Defense Research and
Engineering. Joining the LTV Missiles and Space Company in 1970, he served as Vice
President, Advanced Programs and Marketing. In 1973 he returned to government as
Assistant Secretary of the Army and in 1975 as Under Secretary of the Army and later
as Acting Secretary of the Army. Joining Martin Marietta Corporation in 1977, he served
as Chairman and CEO from 1988 and 1987, respectively, until 1995, having previously
been President and Chief Operating Officer. He served as President of Lockheed Martin
Corporation upon the formation of that company in 1995, and became its Chief
Executive Officer on January 1, 1996, and later Chairman. Retiring as an employee of
Lockheed Martin in August, 1997, he joined the faculty of the Princeton University
School of Engineering and Applied Science where he served as Lecturer with the Rank
of Professor until July, 1999.
Mr. Augustine served as Chairman and Principal Officer of the American Red Cross for
nine years and as Chairman of the National Academy of Engineering, the Association of
the United States Army, the Aerospace Industry Association, and the Defense Science
Board. He is a former President of the American Institute of Aeronautics and
Astronautics and the Boy Scouts of America. He is currently a member of the Board of
Directors of ConocoPhillips, Black & Decker, Procter & Gamble and Lockheed Martin
and was founding chairman of In-Q-Tel. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of
Colonial Williamsburg and Johns Hopkins and a former member of the Board of
Trustees of Princeton and MIT. He is a member of the President's Council of Advisors
on Science and Technology and the Department of Homeland Security Advisory Board
and was a member of the Hart/Rudman Commission on National Security.
Mr. Augustine has been presented the National Medal of Technology by the President of
the United States and has five times been awarded the Department of Defense's highest
civilian decoration, the Distinguished Service Medal. He is co-author of The Defense
Revolution and Shakespeare In Charge and author of Augustine's Laws and Augustine's
Travels. He holds eighteen honorary degrees and was selected by Who's Who in
America and the Library of Congress as one of the Fifty Great Americans on the
occasion of Who's Who's fiftieth anniversary. He has traveled in nearly 100 countries
and stood on both the North and South Poles.
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