The O'Keefe Era is About to Begin at NASA


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Photo: House Science Committee
[UPDATE] On Thursday, 20 December 2001, the U.S. Senate unanimously confirmed Sean O'Keefe to head NASA.

Sean O'Keefe, President Bush's nominee for NASA Administrator, appeared before a Senate Committee at his confirmation hearing recently. Although O'Keefe had testified on earlier occasions about NASA, this was the first time he appeared before Congress as the person the President wants to have at the helm of NASA.

O'Keefe's easy demeanor during the course of the hearing clearly demonstrates the confidence that has been placed in him by the Bush Administration. O'Keefe's face is prone to a quick and friendly smile, his posture was both comfortable and confident. This was in marked contrast to a decade of Congressional appearances by Dan Goldin, whose face sprang reflexively into a scowl, while his posture was stiff and confrontational - indicative of a man sitting in the hotseat. To be certain, O'Keefe is not NASA Administrator - at least not yet. But the confidence the White House - and Vice President Cheney in particular, places in him, makes his appointment all but a certainty.

Indeed, members of the committee - from both parties, voiced their support for a swift confirmation for O'Keefe such that he could be on the job at NASA as soon as possible. Both Senators Hutchinson and Wyden wanted to be certain that O'Keefe would report for work right after confirmation. O'Keefe replied that he wanted to take a Christmas break with his family but, barring no problems with his confirmation, wanted to be on the job at NASA "as close to New Year's day as is possible." The only hold up could come from a recent threat to put a "hold" on all judicial nominations by Sen. John Kerry (D-MA) so as to force action on a small business bill he introduced.

The Senators were quick to ask O'Keefe why he thought he was qualified for the job. O'Keefe was quick to note that he was not , in many people's eyes, the ideal choice. He cited his father whom he described as a Renaissance man, who, although retired is "in college studying astrophysics and the German language" with experience as one of the men who shaped Hyman Rickover's nuclear navy as being a more appropriate choice. None the less it is O'Keefe and not his father who is slated to head NASA. To the task at hand O'Keefe said "I am a public servant that has served in a range of positions. These have given me a working understanding of the management issues. My qualifications are that of a public administrator - I don't try to be chief engineer."

  • 13 July 2001: OMB centralizes control of management issues, Government Executive

    "What's really interesting here is the way that Sean O'Keefe is centralizing management authority around himself," said Paul Light, a scholar at the Brookings Institution. "There's no deputy director for management in sight, and O'Keefe has become the chief hit man for rejecting everything from [a recent] e-government bill to civil service reform, and is clearly the engine behind the outsourcing initiative."

  • 1 May 2001: Building on Blueprints, Government Executive

    ".. the job of moving the [Bush Administration's] management agenda forward has fallen to Sean O'Keefe, OMB's deputy director and the first Cabinet-level deputy to be confirmed by the Senate. No stranger to government, O'Keefe has been a presidential management intern at OMB's National Security Division, a Capitol Hill staffer, comptroller of the Defense Department and Secretary of the Navy."

  • 19 March 2001: Rumsfeld brings corporate approach to Pentagon Inc., Government Executive

    "Asked to foretell the Pentagon's future under the George W. Bush team, a high-ranking Administration official told National Journal: "The Pentagon and the rest of the world are going to be run out of the White House by Vice President [Dick] Cheney and [Deputy Budget Director] Sean O'Keefe," with Rumsfeld their enthusiastic implementer at the Pentagon. "It's already clear that [Secretary of State] Colin Powell and [White House National Security Adviser] Condoleezza Rice are not going to be players" in the transformation of the American military."

  • 30 October 2000: Cheney has experience with government's biggest bureaucracy, Government Executive

    "In selecting a personal staff, Cheney would probably turn to trusted aides who have followed him to prominent jobs before, including ... Sean O'Keefe, who Cheney elevated from Pentagon comptroller to Navy Secretary, and who now directs national security studies at Syracuse University's Maxwell School of Public Affairs... "

  • Why O'Keefe?

    Sean O'Keefe did not come to Washington to head NASA. Rather, he came here to be a key individual at OMB and to oversee much-needed reforms in how government agencies do business. That is his forte. He is not a space cadet nor was he the President's first choice for NASA Administrator. His selection came after two trends made themselves glaringly evident at the White House.

    The first had to do with the internal assessment that the White House had made of NASA. A house cleaning was in order - and a person with experience in that regard was sought. Recall for a moment what the Bush Team walked into. Shortly after the election settled out, a massive and heretofore unsuspected cost overrun at NASA emerged - this after NASA had assured Congress that all was well in the program only a few weeks earlier. Many in the Bush Administration privately blame Goldin for sitting on the bad news hoping that Al Gore would be elected. To be sure, there were other potential cost embarrassments in the wings - the X-33 being the most notable. The Bush team made short work of that project directing NASA to scuttle the program in place shortly after Bush took office. Some people at NASA got the message - changes were ahead. Others did not - and still haven't.

    Second, no one would take the job at NASA. Many quality names came and went. Some came very close to getting the job only to turn it down. Informed speculation centered around a number of prominent advisory committee chairs and CEOs from the private sector. The string of turn downs was due, in part, to the dire financial condition NASA had shown itself to be in - most notably with regard to the International Space Station. Taking on such a problem didn't strike many as being their next career move. As such, placing one of their chief government managers and budgeteers at the helm - a personal friend and longtime coworker of the Vice President's - one of the first people brought to Washington by the Bush Administration earlier this year - struck many as an obvious choice.

    Does the Bush Administration Care About NASA - or Space Policy?

    In picking O'Keefe, the Bush Administration has taken one of their core team players and sent him on a special mission to fix NASA - to "get back to basics" as O'Keefe repeatedly described his task. While Dan Goldin obviously enjoyed the support of three Administrations, he was never seen as being anything close to an insider or a core team member. O'Keefe is. Indeed, to extend the analogy, O'Keefe has helped write the very playbook NASA will now be expected to adhere to.

    To date, little has been forthcoming from the White House that could be called "space policy". While such a policy is painfully overdue, it should not be lost on those who track such things, that the Bush Administration put one of their most trusted people at NASA. While this may be indicative of the severity of the problems at the agency. It is also indicative of just how serious the Bush Administration is in fixing the agency - even if they have no policy in hand with which to guide the repairs.

    O'Keefe will have company (and a policy soulmate) as the Bush Administration moves to develop its approach to space. The only bright light with regards to an overt attempt to examine - and perhaps formulate space policy thus far by the Bush Administration - is the Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry headed by former House Science Committee Chairman Bob Walker. Walker is known to have the ear of the Bush Administration on space, defense, and technology matters. Indeed, a generous amount of flexibility has apparently been given to Walker as his Commission charts the recommended future of America's aerospace sector.

    When asked at the International Space Symposium last month where NASA is in the scheme of things from the Bush Administration's perspective, Walker said "NASA is seen as an agency that needs to get back to its R&D roots. It needs to get back to that and give us new paradigms. NASA can play an important role in commercial and civilian space - but also in the military sector as well." Walker said that his Commission would make policy recommendations that could lead to programs. He said that the Commission's principal role is to "look to the future and provide a roadmap for how NASA can thrive in the future." When asked how the Commission's activities would synch up with other efforts to examine policy - such as those being undertaken by the National Security Council, Walker said "This commission will cooperate with other efforts - that is why I will be talking with Vice President Cheney."

    Military and Civilian Space: A New Collaboration Ahead?

    When a questioner suggested to Bob Walker that "this Administration does not care about space" Walker said that the questioner's comment was "not a fair characterization." He went on to say that "some areas not high on their policy agenda - yet the military side is high on their agenda." He said that he saw a role for the Commission is suggesting how the U.S guides future investments. With regard to space - and specifically the military uses of space, Walker said that the Bush Administration saw the Rumsfeld report on space as a "valid document" and that "they intend to implement it." He added that there was "no doubt that the President has been committed to a space-based defense". "The question for us is whether there are pieces of space community that understand that focus." Walker said that should be opportunities to make investments in military and defense areas that can apply to other areas as well.

    At several points in his testimony, Sean O'Keefe was asked to address issues of overall Bush space policy and how he foresaw interaction between civilian and military space programs. O'Keefe said " we cannot continue to have separation between national defense and civil space. We need to look for overlaps and collaborative opportunities." Sen. Weyden noted that the Bush Administration places considerable importance upon ballistic missile defense. He noted that President Eisenhower saw a separation between military and civilian space programs as being a good thing to strive for.

    O'Keefe replied "this is not a newsflash. I can tell that I am committed to a much closer collaboration with Defense Department on issues of national security and to use infrastructures efficiently. There are ways that we can capitalize on this without violating the spirit of separation. Yesterday I spoke with a friend on the National Security Council (NSC) staff. We were heading towards a series of definitions of what space policy would be. September 11th changed that. Now I have seen enthusiasm within the NSC staff to generate that reinvigorated policy."

    When asked by Weyden to elaborate on areas where collaboration could occur O'Keefe said "development of launch capabilities. It is important to work out requirements for lift capacity." Referring back to his conversation with an NSC friend he said "we talked about history - one that is unsettling. There has been a conflict between the U.S. Air Force (USAF) and NASA . 15 years ago, at a time when the Shuttle program was developing a potential commercial effort - one that would be competitive with heavy lift capacity of USAF. This created an enormous rift between the USAF and NASA. Modest design changes were made to avoid accommodating the other's institution. We paid a lot more for redundant capacity. I do not want to see this happen again. This is the time to start this collaboration."

    Congress Makes Its Views Known

    O'Keefe's choice is seen by many as sending a very clear signal to NASA and Congress: O'Keefe has the White House's backing for all of the tough decisions he is about to make. He also has their support when it comes to facing Congressional pressure that will likely result from the implementation of these decisions. A preview of some of the hurdles O'Keefe will have to surmount surfaced at his confirmation hearing. While the tone of his confirmation hearings was warm - and often jovial, several senators made it clear that they would only allow the White House to go so far before setting their foot down.

    All of the committee members present commended O'Keefe's intent to fix NASA's fiscal problems noting that someone with a firm fiscal and managerial background was what the agency sorely needs right now. In so doing, however, they also sought to immediately tie O'Keefe's hands. Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) warned O'Keefe that any sort of BRAC (base closure) activity with regard to NASA's field centers would " meet a lot of resistance from us in the room."

    O'Keefe has made it known previous to this hearing that he strongly supported the recent Young Committee report on the International Space Station (ISS). Key to the committee's recommendations is that NASA focus on a 3 person crew capability for the ISS in the near term while it gets its finances fixed and management reforms into place. Once a "credible" management plan and budget is available the decision could then be made to go forth to a full 7 person crew. O'Keefe has been reluctant to say that it is a given that NASA will get the green light to go towards a full 7 person station.

    Sen. Hutchinson (R-TX) pushed O'Keefe to support a 7 person ISS crew - complete with an Crew Return Vehicle (also delayed) . In so doing she made it clear to O'Keefe that "you'll be my hero if you do this. But I will be all over you if you don't".

    Another core recommendation of the Young Committee was to limit Space Shuttle missions to 4 per year and use the money saved to take care of ISS cost problems. During the course of the hearing Sen. Nelson (D-FL) made half a dozen pointed reminders that implementation of the Young Committee's recommendation to reduce the Shuttle flight rate would have a serious impact on NASA safety and the skill mix of its workforce. Nelson repeated Sen. Hutchinson's caveat " I'll be over you" if O'Keefe were to pursue these options.

    O'Keefe: More May Not Be Better

    Sen. Allen (R-VA) wasted no time in directing his focus on aeronautics (NASA's Langley Research Center is in his state). In so doing, O'Keefe started to show some of the philosophy that is gong to settle into place regarding budgets and priorities. Allen asked O'Keefe to comment on the fact that "during period of decline funding for NASA, the Europeans and Japanese have increased aeronautics R&D funding. Meanwhile, proposed reductions in NASA R&D aeronautics are being put forth. Do you believe that it is in our best interest as a nation to allow aeronautics capabilities to whither?"

    O'Keefe replied (without hesitation) "there is a mindset in every federal program: if there is more money the year later that is good - if not, that is bad. Success is an increase - a decrease is viewed as disaster. This tells you nothing. What I find most challenging is opportunity to implement the President's management agenda. NASA's budget is 4 times the size of EPA's - it is largest single independent agency." O'Keefe went on to say that he saw a emphasis placed on "performance and outcomes - not based on increases or decreases - but rather the best choices to get the most outcome."

    No Finger Pointing Allowed

    Given the problems that face NASA, and the history of events that led to them, it would be a natural thing for Congress or the White House to seek someone to blame. Sen. Nelson touched on this issue by saying "when you put [things] in a context that NASA has been a 'bad boy' that is when I get concerned. No less a space giant, than Chris Kraft, has written a letter about Young Committee Report. He found it difficult to understand "that such a group would present such a narrow view. You would think that members of task force would try to understand ISS history - that today's financial status was preordained." Nelson said " I don't want to just focus on what is wrong - but to fix it. But I don't want to use this to punish NASA."

    O'Keefe replied "since January 20th the President has directed us to view all matters a looking forward - not the past. There is no intent to punish. My intent is not to try to unearth what led to this circumstance - it is WHERE WE ARE. We need to get back to basics - and define requirements. I want to build on what is there and utilize existing capability that is there."

    When asked to speculate on what amount of funding might be needed to get the ISS from a 3 to a 7 person capability O'Keefe said "I don't have confidence that a 10-15 % increase is the right number. NOT A CLUE. I think many members of Congress have said that this is a "high tech" program. Anyone who thinks that there is a precision in cost estimation is kidding themselves. This is seen in many other places. But to be off 20-25% over last year after 5 years of saying previously that this would be the final cost - that ought to speak a level of certainty that was NEVER PRESENT. My fondest hope is to get this rebaselined -and then start talking about what is needed to make this the useful program that we started in a few years ago."

    When asked about the fact that NASA raised its $4 billion ISS cost overrun by $800 million only days after O'Keefe testified on the subject on Capitol Hill last Spring he noted with some irony that it was referred to as" the O'Keefe bump". O'Keefe said "this reminds us that we should not have any more confidence in these numbers than any that proceeded us. This concerns me. There is nothing that says that we can take this to the bank. There is no interest whatsoever in offering NASA a blank check -indeed that would be irresponsible."

    Young Report: Angry Partners

    One of the more controversial aspects of the Young Committee's report are the issues that would face the other countries participating in the ISS program. Many of their contributions would either be delayed or added to a space station with less capability for utilization than had been incorporated into the various international agreements that underlie the program. When asked by Sen. Weyden whether the US will comply with these international agreements O'Keefe replied " I intend to work with [Secretary of State] Colin Powell to ensure that we very carefully respond to these agreements and that we work with the State Department to reach complete compliance."

    Sen. Nelson referred to an article in the Orlando Sentinel where representatives of ESA, CSA, and Russia spoke rather bluntly about their countries respective opinions on the ISS options presented by the Young Committee. Nelson said "the Europeans have threatened to pull out. They are put in difficult situation. He added that formal protests had been circulated in the media from ESA and CSA - an d that CSA had suggested that the US had breached the international agreement between the two countries. Nelson then asked "What is your thinking about how we assure the international partners that they will have full utilization of the ISS - while you handle these other issues/" O'Keefe replied that his first order of business " is to talk with my friends Colin Powell and [Deputy Secretary of State] Richard Armitage to determine what our response will be."

    Space Shuttle: Upgrade, Privatize, or Replace?

    Sen. Nelson has many concerns with the 4 flight per year flight rate suggested by the Young Report. He said that implementation of this recommendation would not only have the effect of layoffs it would also have the effect of likely mothballing one of the four orbiters. "That is going backwards not forward." He then moved to the SLI - the Space Launch Initiative. Under the SLI Nelson said "Space Shuttle upgrades funding has been minimized." He noted that under the present plan they will not be funded after 2005 - this based on "NASA's plan to shelve the shuttle fleet by 2012 because they have $5 billion for his thing called SLI- which is really a technology development initiative."

    O'Keefe noted that he needs to "get more informed on SLI.: He went on to say that "this is a golden opportunity to reach for collaborations with the USAF and DoD." Nelson replied that NASA's plan to have a system in place the Shuttle fleet did not happen. He expressed his frustration that $5 billion is in place to develop technology but that Shuttle upgrades are to be postponed or not done at all. He cautioned that if there is not going to actually be a replacement vehicle in place by 2012 that there will be a need to keep the present Shuttle fleet in good condition. He said " One of the things you may look at since this SLI is focused more toward development of technology is to see if you can get DoD as partner in sharing the cost of that because it would directly affect them. This would give NASA more breathing room to do Shuttle safety upgrades".

    On the issue of Space Shuttle privatization, O'Keefe said "we need to look at current contractual commitments - and then look at what implications there are to resident in-house public and scientific and technical community that needs to be maintained. What alarms me is that better than half of the science, engineering, and technical staff at NASA will be eligible to retire in the next 3 to 5 years. We really need to focus on the strategic management of human capital and BOY DO WE NEED TO DO IT HERE. The Apollo era legacy is about the retire. How you reinvigorate that spirit is going to be hard."

    What Makes Sean O'Keefe Tick?

    Sean O'Keefe has a lot on his hands. Many at NASA fear that his current position at OMB (and elsewhere) as a "bean counter" will lead him to make cuts and closures with an eye fixed only upon the bottom line. This is not going to be the case. Yes, there will be closure of programs (perhaps not field centers), targeted RIFs, reassignments, and consolidation of expertise, but the agency is not going to be carved up. Even the most superficial look at O'Keefe's background would lead one to expect exactly the opposite.

    O'Keefe's record, to be sure, includes some large program cancellations. It also includes the making of some tough and much needed decisions that careerists at an agency might have dismissed out of hand. The dismemberment of NASA would not be an "accomplishment" for someone like O'Keefe. Rather, getting the agency focused and back on track fiscally would be an accomplishment he would work for. His intent is going to be to fix the agency - even if, to some in the trenches, the fixes may look like tactical airstrikes.

    As the Strategic Resources Review begins to have its effect next year, O'Keefe's rhetoric may sound eerily like that of Dan Goldin at times - but there will be one key distinction. Goldin certainly liked to talk tough. But in reality, Goldin never made many of the tough decisions that needed to be made. Nor did he leave the fixes that he did make in place long enough to prove themselves. His approach was to keep everyone a little off balance, use temporary fixes, and hope that this would provide enough momentum to get him through the crisis du jour. Moreover, the Clinton Administration did not want to take all of the political heat that would have been forthcoming had some of the tough decisions been attempted. Indeed, when Goldin did try to get the White House to make tough decisions, they simply would not agree to the expenditure of political capital.

    That is not what O'Keefe's arrival at NASA will herald. The White House has signaled its intent on giving him the latitude he needs to accomplish his task. Indeed, they took him away from a valued role wherein he oversaw issues affecting the entire government to focus on one single (and comparatively small) agency.

    O'Keefe's task at NASA is not going to be easy. Senators Lott, Hutchinson, and Nelson all made it clear in blunt terms that they want O'Keefe to do some things but not others. When revisions to field center roles and missions, moves towards real shuttle privatization, and workforce adjustments all start to be implemented, you can expect there to be howls of protest. O'Keefe is going to have to use every skill he has to pull this off.

    As one anticipates what O'Keefe will do - you need to look at his career and see why and how he does things. As mentioned before O'Keefe is one of the Bush Administration's key players and a long-time personal confidant of Vice President Cheney. Indeed, given the CEO manner with which Cheney runs the government, and O'Keefe's relationship with Cheney, there are not going to be a lot of intermediaries in the communication chain as there were between Goldin and the Clinton White House. Add to this the fact that Bob Walker also has a close relationship with Cheney and there exists a chance that decisions will be made in a more prompt and efficient manner - and their implementation will have much more explicit support of the White House.

    O'Keefe's career is one of sequential advance with the ascent of each rung in the career ladder following in a logical sequence. Even the years he spent in academia served a purpose wherein he was able to work out the details of his own managerial philosophy - one he has been using to steer the way Federal Agencies work.

    As for motivations, just before September 11th, idle speculation about Secretary of State Rumsfeld's grasp of his job caused the rumor mill to reflexively churn out possible names as possible successors. Sean O'Keefe's name was at the top of this list. One can expect that O'Keefe's task is to fix NASA and then, several years down the road, once that is done, to move to a cabinet level agency - possibly DoD. A broken and dysfunctional NASA will not be a stepping stone to such a position.

    The Bush team clearly likes to go with people they know and trust. Indeed, there is somewhat of a precedent for picking Sean O'Keefe(originally brought on board as a fiscal and managerial expert) for a special mission to actually go and fix an agency with 'fiscal and managerial' problems. Dick Cheney headed the vice presidential selection process for George Bush only to end up as Bush's choice for Vice President. It is almost certain that Cheney saw a new niche for O'Keefe at NASA and asked him to go there.

    What are the people of NASA and its contractors to do?

    There is going to be change - of that we can all be certain. The White House and O'Keefe have deemed NASA's fiscal credibility to be low and its management in dire need of reform. Yet, O'Keefe is openly admiring of NASA and its people and the truly amazing things that they have - and continue to accomplish. His avowed task is to help NASA get back to what it is best at - making these amazing advances.

    Some things to keep an eye open for in the next several years:

    • transition of the operation of the U.S. assets on the ISS to a NGO (Non Governmental Organization)

    • a relook and recompetition of Space Shuttle processing with an eye towards clear and overt privatization. One would expect a strong urge to move things from MSFC, JSC, and Palmdale to the place where shuttles are launched and processed i.e. KSC.

    • a move of the basic SLI approach from a disconnected collection of technology development efforts to one wherein vehicles are developed and flown. Moreover, such an effort, housed at NASA, might have significant DoD contributions.

    • A mixture of targeted RIFs and hirings to reduce the workforce where needed yet acquire the desired skill mix in other areas.

    • A push for public/private partnership in the operation of some field center (i.e. ARC, JPL, GRC, and LaRC) along lines already in place at ARC and to some extent at JPL. In O'Keefe's world he who leverages the best wins.

    • A much tighter focus on core roles of field centers with consolidation of efforts in one place - not many.

    The NASA family has two choices: they can take advantage of the opportunity O'Keefe's arrival marks and work with him to fix the agency's problems and provide him with quality advice as he seeks to make those changes. O'Keefe openly admits that he is not a rocket scientist "my qualifications are that of a public administrator - I don't try to be chief engineer". He didn't get this far by not listening to those who know more than he does. On the other hand, he has found a way to make decisions when divergent points of view are presented.

    The other path open to the NASA family is to fight to preserve their turf - perhaps winning temporary reprieves as Congress steps in to intercede. This will do little forestall the inevitable - indeed it might serve to make the final decisions even more painful.

    House Science Committee Sherwood Boehlert (R-NY) probably best encapsulated O'Keefe's capabilities and the task that lies ahead of him as he introduced O'Keefe at his confirmation hearings: "Sean is a budgeteer, not a rocketter - but he knows enough about rockets to know that they burn cash just as assuredly as they burn fuel, and that both propellants are finite. It won't hurt to have someone who can husband the agency's resources, for this is an agency that has lost its way..."

    Related Links

  • 7 December 2001: Chairman Boehlert Introduces NASA Administrator Sean O'Keefe at Senate Confirmation Hearing (with photos), House Science Committee
  • 27 November 2001: Spacelift Washington: Aldrin's vision of space may have at last found a home, SpaceRef
  • 30 October 2001: The Commission on the Future of the United States Aerospace Industry Begins its Task, SpaceRef
  • 14 November 2001: Rep. Ralph Hall Comments on NASA Administrator's Departure and Nominee
  • 13 November 2001: OMB official to be named as NASA head, UPI
  • 3 May 2001: Testimony of Sean O'Keefe, OMB, before the House Appropriations Subcommittee on VA/HUD and Independent Agencies
  • 13 February 2001: Spacelift Washington: The Future of Space Part Two: President's Space Advisory Board to be staffed with outside experts
  • 31 January 2001: Spacelift Washington: Hart-Rudman Panel endorses SIG Space for civil, military space policy-and space launch
  • 28 January 2001: Spacelift Washington: National Security Space Needs May Drive Bush Space Policy - A Special White Paper Background Report
  • 10 January 2001: Spacelift Washington: Commission to Recommend Military Space Boost, New Programs

    Background Information

  • 7 November 2001: VA/HUD Conference Report H. Rpt. 107-272 (NASA Excerpt)
  • 29 October 2001: Spacelift Washington: Space Loan Bill May Re-emerge Attached to NASA Spending, SpaceRef
  • 26 October 2001: Spacelift Washington: NASA spending continued at '01 level, SpaceRef
  • 10 October 2001: Letter from Associate Deputy Administrator Daniel Mulville re: "Further Guidance for October 12 SRR Meeting"
  • 9 October 2001: Letter from Associate Deputy Administrator Daniel Mulville re: "Guidance for October 12 SRR Meeting"
  • 3 October 2001: Spacelift Washington: RLV rider dies as stripped down DoD bill passes, SpaceRef
  • 29 September 2001: Spacelift Washington: RLV Help Proposed for FY02 DoD Budget Bill, SpaceRef
  • 28 September 2001: Concept of Privatization of the Space Shuttle Program, NASA JSC (Executive Summary)
  • 26 September 2001: OMB releases first round of 2001 FAIR Act lists, Government Executive
  • 13 September 2001: Letter from NASA Chief of Staff Courtney Stadd re: "Strategic Resources Review Follow-up on Candidate Actions"
  • 5 September 2001: Federal Astronomy Programs Should Not Be Combined, NAS (With text of the Committee's recommendations and link to the full report)
  • 28 August 2001: Spacelift Washington: NASA Budget Faces Squeeze when Congress Returns, SpaceRef
  • 14 August 2001: S. Rpt. 107-43: FY 2002 Senate VA/HUD Appropriations Bill Committee Report: NASA
  • 25 July 2001: H. Rpt. 107-159 (excerpt) House VA/HUD Report: NASA
  • 19 July 2001: Committee Approves Fiscal Year 2002 VA-HUD-Independent Agencies Appropriations Bill, Senate Committee on Appropriations
  • 10 July 2001: House Appropriations VA-HUD Subcommittee Reports VA-HUD FY2002 Spending Bill, press release
  • 8 July 2001: The International Space Station's Distressing Shortfall, SpaceRef
  • 9 May 2001: Science Committee Members Blast GOP Budget For Inadequately Funding Science, House Science Committee, Democratic Membership
  • 25 April 2001: Testimony of NASA Administrator Goldin Before the House Science Committee on NASA's FY 2002 Budget Request
  • 10 April 2001: House Staff Analysis Finds Uneven Support For Federal Research & Development Programs in President's Budget, House Minority membership
  • 9 April 2001: Details of NASA's FY 2002 Budget, OMB/White House
  • 6 April 2001: Congress, NASA, and the International Space Station: A New Civility?, SpaceRef (in four parts)
  • 1 March 2001: NASA Reaches Milestone in Space Launch Initiative Program: Also Announces no SLI Funding for X-33 or X-34, NASA PAO
  • 28 February 2001: Memo NASA Staff: FY 2002 Budget Blueprint Overview by NASA Associate Administrator for Space Flight Joe Rothenberg, NASA HQ
  • 28 February 2001: NASA's Budget Revealed: A quick look at the new ISS - rather, what's left of it, SpaceRef
  • 28 February 2001: Highlights of 2002 NASA Funding: A Blueprint for New Beginnings -- A Responsible Budget for America's Priorities, White House
  • 23 February 2001: Letter from (former) JSC Center Director George Abbey to Senior Staff: Actions Required to Address ISS Budget Challenges
  • 6 July 2000: That's One Colossal Rounding Error: NASA Makes $590 Million Accounting Mistake, House Science Committee


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